One day in June 1951, the U.S. imperialists had no other choice but to propose an armistice talks to the DPRK as they had already fallen in the bottomless pit in the Fatherland Liberation War.
It meant the victory of the DPRK that the U.S. imperialists begged for the armistice talks throwing away even the prestige of “great power” which used to say it had never known defeat in wars of aggression.
Regarding this, President Kim Il Sung said to the chief of the general staff of the Korean People’s Army that American scoundrels proposed a cease-fire to us from the standpoint of the vanquished, but more insidious scheme could be hidden behind it. And then the President underscored that he should keep firmly in his mind that Yankees could win time behind the talks to get ready for a new large-scale military offensive.
Finally, the President taught him that our stand toward the ceasefire talks was that we would agree both to ceasefire or prolonged war and he, therefore, should insist our assertion boldly in the presence of the US imperialists.
As was taught by the President, the chief of the general staff maintained our bold stand that we would agree both to ceasefire or prolonged war, thus frustrating the enemy’s false assertions and taking the leadership at the talks.
