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KIM IL SUNG

THE WORKERS' PARTY OF KOREA IS THE ORGANIZER OF VICTORY IN THE FATHERLAND LIBERATION WAR

Speech to the Teaching Staff and Students
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Comrades,

Today I would like to speak to you about the policies and leadership role assumed by our Party after the outbreak of the Fatherland Liberation War.

As soon as the Fatherland Liberation War broke out, our Party clearly defined the character of this war. At first, we thought this war to be a civil war against the puppet Syngman Rhee clique. But a few days later when the US imperialists directly launched an armed intervention, the Political Committee of the Party Central Committee made it clear that this war was not simply a civil war but a Fatherland Liberation War against formidable foreign imperialist aggressors. For victory in the war we immediately formed the Military Commission, called upon the entire people to rise in arms and expanded and strengthened the People's Army. At the same time, we appealed to the people throughout the world for backing and supporting our people's struggle.

At the outbreak of the war, our People's Army fought back the enemy's invasion at one stroke and, crossing the 38th parallel, advanced swiftly to the Raktong River sector. When the US imperialists

realized that they would not be able to conquer the Korean people easily, they further expanded the armed intervention by mobilizing vast military forces.

Although we had successfully carried out the democratic reforms and founded the Republic after liberation, we had no economic foundation and defence capability as yet powerful enough to cope with US imperialism because our Republic was still young. Nevertheless, attacked by the enemy, we were obliged to fight him with all our forces.

We issued orders for a general mobilization and considerably increased the People's Army divisions. But with an army organized recently and trained for a short period of time, it was impossible to repulse at once the powerful armed forces of the enemy with a history of hundreds of years of aggressive wars.

In October 1950 we had to retreat to the area north of the Chongchon River.

The temporary retreat was the most difficult period our Party had ever experienced during the Fatherland Liberation War. Our country was at stake faced with the alternative of becoming a colony of imperialism again or not. In this grim period when the fate of our country was being decided the eyes of all the Korean people were turned to our Party and the whole world

was following us closely. If we pulled through this serious difficulty and went over again to the counteroffensive, driving off the enemy, this would be a great demonstration of the strength of our people and the mightiness of the democratic camp and give a powerful impetus to the national-liberation struggle of the peoples in colonies and dependent countries. But if we had succumbed to the difficulties and surrendered to the US imperialists, the world would have said, "I thought as much. The United States is such a strong nation. How can so small a country as Korea stand up against it?" And if we had failed to crush the aggressive offensive of the enemy who indulged in bravado and bluster, the US imperialists would have reckoned still more arrogantly that they could invade China and, furthermore, the Soviet Union, to say nothing of Korea, and gain world supremacy. So, we had to put up a vigorous stand and valiantly beat off the enemy, thereby clearly demonstrating to the peoples of the world that the days were already past when the United States was at liberty to conquer small countries.

During our temporary retreat our internal situation was very complex. In our Party there were some waverers and there appeared a defeatist tendency, too.

Taking advantage of the confusion, breaches of discipline and order appeared in the People's Army. Moreover, reactionaries who had wormed their way into the friendly parties committed the crime of murdering our Party members, who had failed to evacuate, in collaboration with the enemy in the areas seized by him.

In this grave situation the Political Committee of the Party Central Committee, with a view to tiding over the difficult situation, took the following steps.

First, we decided that a counteroffensive against the enemy should be launched without fail and that in this the initiative should be taken by the Koreans themselves. Even though we receive foreign aid, we ourselves should take the lead. Only when the master who receives aid plays the part of master well and takes the lead, will the people who give aid feel themselves justified in doing so and become enthusiastic and come forward with greater fervour. In a labour-aid team, too, the villagers will not work with zeal if the master fails to play his role well.

Second instructions were issued to put in order rapidly the army units in retreat, strengthen discipline in the Party and the People's Army, combat the waverers more resolutely and take stringent

organizational measures against them.

We called the Third Plenary Meeting of the Party Central Committee in order to mobilize the entire Party and all the people for the implementation of the decision of the Political Committee of the Party Central Committee. Great successes were achieved by the plenary meeting which was held in a grave period when the fate of the country was being decided.

The plenary meeting of the Party Central Committee confirmed the correctness of the policy adopted by the Political Committee, and the entire membership of the Party gave unreserved support to the appeal and decision of the Party Central Committee.

Around the time when the plenary meeting was held, the People's Army passed over to the counteroffensive and liberated Pyongyang and Seoul, the latter for the second time, and advanced as far as the Suwon area. Then, the People's Army units active behind enemy lines linked up with the main units. During the second offensive our People's Army dealt the enemy a shattering military blow.

With the aim of further consolidating the great successes achieved by our people in the second offensive and mobilizing the entire people for a new

victory, the Political Committee of the Party Central Committee set forth the major fighting tasks for 1951 in accordance with the decision of the Third Plenary Meeting of the Party Central Committee.

In general our Party's instructions concerning the main lines of work for 1951 can be summarized as follows:

First, the Party and government bodies should be rapidly restored;

Second, the People's Army should be further expanded and reinforced and more branches of the technical service trained;

Third, measures should be taken to stabilize the people's life;

Fourth, the struggle against the reactionaries should be intensified;

Fifth, the work of inviting more foreign support and aid should be improved;

Sixth, the guerrillas behind enemy lines should be marshalled and their activities stepped up.

These lines, put forward by the Political Committee of the Party Central Committee for the purpose of carrying into practice the decisions of the Third Plenary Meeting of the Party Central Committee, were absolutely correct.

The Party took a number of important measures to strengthen the People's Army. It dispatched members of the Political Committee of its Central Committee and other cadres of the national level directly to the divisions and frontline units to explain the Party's line to the soldiers, boost their morale and raise the officers' commanding power. As a result, the morale of the army and the commanding power of the officers rose markedly.

The formation of Party organizations in the army units in keeping with the decision of the Political Committee of the Party Central Committee was of special importance in strengthening the People's Army. With the formation of Party organizations the hard-core ranks of the army were further consolidated and the Party's political leadership of the army units was strengthened.

The People's Army grew in scope and strength in terms of armament and techniques, too. Today our People's Army has *MIG-15* fighters it did not have before 1950 and, accordingly, is capable of hitting hard the enemy not only on the ground but also in the air. All the artillery units were also put in order in 1951, and became more formidable than during the first counteroffensive. The units of other technical

branches were also further reinforced.

Through countless operations the People's Army has accumulated a wealth of fighting experience and grown stronger from the point of view of quality. At present our People's Army units are capable of skilfully employing varied tactics such as offensives, position defence, and guerrilla warfare. From the point of view of numerical strength, too, the People's Army has grown. Now our People's Army will stand firm and not fall back one step; it has the upper hand in battle.

Simultaneously with the growth and strengthening of the People's Army, the guerrilla units in south Korea have been revitalized. The People's Army soldiers who failed to retreat and the guerrillas who stayed behind in the localities have linked up and are active in many districts including the Mt Jiri area.

The Party has also paid much attention to the rehabilitation of the dislocated economy, stabilization of the people's life and consolidation of the rear. It formed the committee for the relief of war victims and carried on the work of relieving war sufferers on a wide scale. It set up schools for bereaved children of patriots and orphanages and looked after the war orphans while sending part of them to be brought up

in fraternal countries. Owing to the poor distribution of goods, even salt was in short supply once, but now we are in a position to provide salt and rice even to the mountain areas of Kangwon Province at any time. As you see, the positive steps taken by the Party have made the people's life far more stable.

The war played havoc with industry, but our Party mapped out a plan for national economic development in 1951 and mobilized the masses of working people for its successful implementation.

We quickly rehabilitated the wrecked munitions factories, and resumed the production of submachine guns and other small arms, mortars, shells and bullets to be supplied to the People's Army. In rehabilitating such industries as footwear, clothing and textile which were severely damaged during the enemy bombing raids and in organizing the production, too, our Party overcame all manner of difficulties and scored great successes.

All other branches of the national economy, with the exception of capital construction, fulfilled their plans.

In the field of agriculture the Party ensured that sowing was on time in the spring of 1951. For this it called a conference of active peasants, arranged short

courses for the cadres of the Party cells and people's committees and Party branches of public organizations and did a good deal of organizational work for the spring sowing. Although the bombing raids by enemy planes were severe, Party members were the first to go out into the fields despite the danger and led the peasants in farm work. This is to be applauded.

In 1951 we made sustained efforts to further develop internationalist friendship and cooperation with the fraternal countries, and the support and aid of the peoples of these countries to our people further increased.

The year 1951 witnessed great success in the restoration and consolidation of our Party organizations, too.

But our work in 1951 had shortcomings as well. Mention should be made above all of the shortcomings manifested in the work of restoring and consolidating the Party organizations. The most serious shortcoming is that many officials carried out the Party's line incorrectly. While restoring and consolidating the Party organizations they mechanically issued penalties against many Party members for reasons of Party membership cards.

Since large numbers of Party members had been

killed in the war, the Party ranks should have been replenished through the enrolment of patriots and activists who had fought unflinchingly against the enemy during the retreat, but, rather, the doors of the Party were kept closed. As a result, the Party ranks were prevented from being expanded. Such deviations were sharply criticized at the Fourth Plenary Meeting of the Party Central Committee. A resolute struggle was waged against such wrong tendencies and, in consequence, the Party organizations were fully restored and consolidated and the Party came to be further expanded and developed organizationally.

In order to strengthen the Party we had to combat other serious drawbacks, too. Some Party organizations, not knowing how to conduct their work with the masses, alienated them from the Party rather than rallying them around it, and revealed a bureaucratic tendency by ordering people about and coming down hard on them instead of organizing, encouraging and educating them.

Some Party organizations and officials acted for the government bodies rather than strive to build up the hard cores of the Party and strengthen and develop the Party organizations with the main stress on their restoration and consolidation. As a result, both the

Party work and the work of the government bodies made a poor showing.

There were also Right and “Left” errors at first in the struggle against the reactionaries. In an attempt to take revenge, some people tried in most cases to confiscate the properties of those who had joined the reactionary organizations and finish them off indiscriminately. Such a “Left” action was tantamount to playing into the hands of the enemy in the work of wiping out the reactionaries. During his occupation of the northern half, the insidious enemy formed the “peace maintenance corps” and other reactionary organizations and deliberately caused numerous people to commit crimes against the Workers’ Party. In doing so the enemy calculated that the Workers’ Party, when it returned, would not trust them and that consequently, the masses would split off.

Therefore, the Party took measures to rectify the “Left” deviations committed by the Ministry of the Interior, Ministry of Public Security and local Party organizations in the struggle against the reactionaries. Our Party followed the policy of isolating only the instigators and wicked elements among those who had participated in the reactionary organizations, bringing over to our side again those who had been used as tools.

By isolating the handful of instigators and wicked fellows and generously allowing their followers to return to our side, we made it possible for those still in hiding to surrender themselves to justice of their own accord. But in doing so there has now appeared a Right tendency to bring even the instigators over to our side, claiming that they are “not guilty.” Such fellows will never turn round and come over to our side.

Our Party correctly laid down the line of struggle against the reactionaries and timely criticized and rectified the Right and “Left” errors partly revealed in this struggle, thereby registering great successes in it.

As you see, we scored considerable successes in the course of carrying out the major tasks put forward by the Party in 1951. These successes show that the decision of the Third Plenary Meeting of the Party Central Committee and the guidance given by its Political Committee and Organizational Committee were correct.

On the basis of a careful study and summarization of the work done in 1951, we have clearly defined the line of work for 1952.

The central task of 1952 is to continue to strengthen the Party and government bodies and

public organizations and further reinforce the People's Army on the basis of last year's successes. Only by so doing can we win final victory in the long-drawn-out war.

Unless we strengthen the Party and government organs, public organizations and the People's Army we cannot hope to fight successfully and, moreover, to win the prolonged war.

What should be done to strengthen the Party and government bodies? There is no special way here. For the consolidation of the Party and government bodies we should get rid of the bureaucratic methods of work and the ideological remnants of Japanese imperialism and strengthen the ties with the masses in conformity with the message of our speech made at the Joint Meeting of People's Committee Chairmen and Leading Party Officials of Provinces, Cities and Counties in February this year.

In the February speech we stressed that every Party member should learn to organize, rouse and educate the masses. Because our Party has not grown from an illegal underground party but has undergone a lawful development with power in its hands ever since its inception, our officials are largely apt to take the easy line of giving orders and employing administrative

methods in their work instead of going to the masses and mobilizing them through persevering explanation and persuasion. In order to strengthen the Party, every Party member should organize and mobilize the masses; he should not break away from the masses, nor order them about and bear down on them.

If they are to have correct relations with the masses, the Party cadres and every Party member should, first of all, strengthen their life in the Party cells, develop lively criticism and thoroughly do away with bureaucratism and the ideological remnants of Japanese imperialism. The thing is to carry out to the letter the decision of the Fourth Plenary Meeting of the Party Central Committee with regard to the consolidation of Party cells.

The Party should strengthen its cells; the government organ should strengthen the ri people's committees; and the army should strengthen the companies. The masses are to be found in the lower bodies, and so unless such bodies at lower levels are strengthened the Party cannot take deep roots in the masses.

If the Party fails to sink its roots in the masses, it can possibly crash in the wind like a tree with large spreading branches and weak roots. Only when it has

strong roots can it withstand the wind whatever direction it comes from. If the Party only has a strong upper structure and a weak foundation, it will not be able to withstand a severe test like a tree with shallow roots. If the Party cells, ri people's committees and primary bodies of the mass organizations enhance their role, everything will go well.

At present, however, if there are competent people at lower levels the higher organizations select them and take them away rather than endeavour to consolidate the lower levels. My talks with peasants in Phyongwon County, South Phyongan Province revealed that if there is a competent person in a village who was a primary school graduate before liberation and could become a hard core, he is selected for appointment at county level. Because the higher bodies take away people like this rather than think about training people well and dispatching them to the lower levels, the Party cells are left almost empty.

On my visit to Wonhwa-ri, Tongam Sub-county, Taedong County, South Phyongan Province, I found that the ranks of cadres of the ri are poorly staffed. The villagers had all been tenant farmers before and so received their share of the land; it is a good village said to have been a model village before the war. It

has only 70-odd homes, and has sent more than 70 persons to the People's Army. There are now only old folk and women left in the village. Of the women of this village many including the head of the Women's Union organization are working women who are clever and diligent and loyal to the Party. But both the chairmen of the Party cell of this village and of the ri people's committee are old people. True, they are good people, but they cannot be active because they are old. They are ardent supporters of the Party and the Government of the Republic, but cannot educate, lead, organize and rouse the masses to good effect. By good people the Party does not merely mean meek, good-natured people. Those who can faithfully carry out the Party's policies are truly good people.

This spring we visited that village early in the morning without notice. When we called on the head of the ri Women's Union organization and asked her how matters stood with the sowing, she answered: "We women folk can manage it ourselves all right, but we are really annoyed because the livestock breeding station or something over there is making a mess of things. It has as many as 16 oxen, but is almost starving them to death. It is greedily insisting on cultivating as many as 30 hectares of non-paddy

fields, but they aren't likely to manage that much. Please teach those people a lesson." Then she went on to say: "There is a certain producers' cooperative over there, and I'm sure they are merchants pursuing their own interests while cheating the state." Upon examination, we really found them to be merchants. And when I summoned the executives of the livestock breeding station, the head of the Women's Union organization fell on them vehemently with: "You're responsible for the low production in our village." Then, she added: "Because a landlord fellow here was left with a free hand, this fellow has now gone to Pyongyang and become the manager of a state-owned restaurant there. Why leave such a fellow alone? Even now I could go and take him back."

As you see, they have many active women Party members who are infinitely loyal to the Party and the Government, have a strong hatred for the enemy and are straightforward. But the county Party committee does not take on such fine women as cadres, probably because they are women. I went to several other places and found that the same was the case with all of them.

Upon returning from Wonhwa-ri, I gave my views on the matter: "The masters of the countryside are

now women. It is necessary to admit many women to the Party and train many of them as activists to play a leading role in the countryside.”

In order to strengthen the Party cells we should train the hard cores who know how to work among the masses and how to educate, organize and mobilize them. A village without hard cores cannot carry on its existence.

Have we, then, people who are eligible for hard cores? We have any number of such people. The question is to pick out such people and educate them so that they can guide the masses.

You should also proceed to the nearby Party cells and train their hard cores, thereby making them qualified to skilfully organize and mobilize the masses. Then, these hard cores will in their turn train other Party members in the same way and the roots of the Party will grow stronger step by step.

In order to strengthen the Party it is necessary, in a word, to consolidate the Party cells in accordance with the decision of the Fourth Plenary Meeting of the Party Central Committee and to get rid of the ideological remnants of Japanese imperialism and bureaucratism according to the February speech; and in order to strengthen the government bodies it is

necessary to put stress on the consolidation of the ri people's committees. When the ri level bodies are strengthened, the work will go well even if the central authorities give instructions immediately to the ri, bypassing the intermediary stages such as sub-county and county.

In the People's Army all efforts should be concentrated on the strengthening of the companies. At present a widespread movement is afoot for the creation of model companies. When the companies become strong the whole army will be strong.

The strengthening of the Party, government organs and army depends on the strengthening of the Party cells, ri, and companies. The public organizations such as the Women's Union and the Democratic Youth League can also be strengthened but only if their primary organizations are built up adequately.

Now, it is urgent to raise the leadership level of the cadres of the administrative and economic organizations. At present the leadership level of the officials of the state organs is generally low.

What is important in raising the leadership level of the officials of state organs is, above all, that they acquire the specialized knowledge needed in their particular fields of work. The leadership level of

many officials is low precisely because they have no specialized knowledge. Some people read the *History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union* allegedly to raise their theoretical level, but make little effort to acquire the professional knowledge of their particular fields. If you are to guide the work of the administrative and economic bodies after finishing school, you should possess specialized knowledge. If you enter the service of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry for example, you will not be able to guide the establishments under the ministry properly without having a knowledge of agriculture and forestry.

Our Party members should not simply be good persons. People often say, "This man is loyal to the Party because he is of worker origin." When asked, "What is his work ability?" they answer, "He is a good person, but his work ability is not great." An incompetent man cannot be regarded as faithful to the Party. Only an able and highly-qualified man who correctly carries out the Party's instructions is a faithful Party member, but a good-for-nothing who sits still cannot be regarded as such.

When I ask some comrade to make an inspection trip to a stock farm, he goes and has a look round and

returns, but when I ask him if he has any good suggestions to improve the work of the farm, he answers he has nothing special to suggest. This is because he has no professional knowledge. Our officials' lack of professional knowledge is a serious drawback.

Yet another official says, "I don't know much about work because I'm of worker origin," and makes hardly any endeavour to study. This is a gross mistake. A man of worker origin should study all the more diligently and do his work so much the better.

To acquire the professional knowledge needed in one's own field of work is stipulated in the Party Rules, too, as a duty of Party members. At the Second Party Congress we added this provision to the Party Rules because it was a very important question. But many Party members make no endeavour to discharge this duty.

The officials of all state organs should make tireless efforts to acquire professional knowledge along with political knowledge.

In order to raise the work level of the officials of state organs it is also important to do away with a lack of planning in their work.

In the February speech, too, we stressed the need to

carry on all work according to plan. Yet, state officials still fail to draw up plans and check on their implementation. Working without a plan, you cannot hope for success. State officials should make it a point to plan, organize, direct, check and sum up work.

And Party organizations should not act for government bodies but should always educate and encourage government officials so that they display activity and creative initiative.

Further, I would like to remark on the tasks of our Party in the field of economic work.

First, it is necessary to eliminate the irrational disposition of industries and distribute them properly in the light of our war experience, and further increase the production of war supplies through the development of the munitions industry.

The factories and enterprises set up mainly in the coastal areas previously by the Japanese imperialists to facilitate plunder, should be moved to places where raw materials are available, places that are conveniently situated for transport and supply to the people and are safe from the viewpoint of national defence, so that they can continue production even under wartime conditions.

Second, serious attention should be paid to the

work of further stabilizing and improving the people's standard of living.

Third, proper preparations should be made from now on to rehabilitate the war-ravaged industries and lay the foundation for our country's industrial development in the future. This poses the question of cadres, technicians, raw materials and other materials.

In rehabilitating the ravaged industries after the war and laying the basis of industrial development in the future, the less urgent branches should be left till later on and work should be started first on the urgent branches.

For the implementation of this economic policy of our Party it is essential, first of all, to tap all the domestic resources and manpower, economize more and save more. And the people should be encouraged to display more activity and creative initiative and to bravely pull through all difficulties and hardships.

Measures should be taken to make effective use of the aid from fraternal countries while all domestic forces are mobilized.

Now, I pass on to the question as to where to place the main emphasis in information work and education for the people at the present moment.

The most important aspect of information work

and education for the people is to instil them with national pride and confidence in victory. By boosting their national pride they should be made to have confidence that Koreans are strong and perfectly capable of defeating any enemy.

The Korean people are strong enough to beat off any foreign invaders. Somebody said that the Koreans are good at fighting because they are ignorant. We refuted him by saying that the Koreans are good at fighting not because they are ignorant but because they are scholarly. Because they tasted the bitterness of life as a ruined people in the past, the Korean people are firmly determined not to fall into slavery to imperialism again. Thanks to the democratic reforms after liberation our people became the masters of the factories and land and found themselves in a position to send their sons and daughters to middle school and university. They experienced a free and happy life under the people's government. They know full well that they must not be robbed of such precious revolutionary gains and that they could not become colonial slaves again. That is why the Koreans are brave in battle; this is not merely blind courage by any means.

The People's Army is made up of youths who received democratic education for five years after

liberation. They are all sons and daughters of workers and peasants who before liberation were humiliated and oppressed from both the class and national points of view. That is why our People's Army fights consciously and stubbornly for their country and their people.

It is also important to educate the people in the spirit of internationalism. Ours is a time when the imperialists cannot freely invade any country that belongs to the democratic camp. The Korean people's struggle is a graphic illustration of this. We are in the powerful democratic camp and have active support and aid from the fraternal countries, and so can wage a prolonged struggle against the armed invasion of the US imperialists and their satellite states and win final victory in the war.

We must understand clearly that the international aid we are receiving today is aid of a new type.

While educating the people to have a spirit of self-reliance, national self-respect and faith in their strength, we should equip them with internationalist ideas so that they become keenly conscious of the need for forging an enduring unity with the peoples of the Soviet Union, China and other countries of the democratic camp.

Further, it is of great importance in the education of the people to induce them to foster a more intensive hatred for the enemy.

The US imperialist aggressors are the sworn enemies of our people. The US imperialists have played havoc with all our factories and mercilessly slaughtered our parents, wives and children, and our fellow countrymen. No enemy could be more vicious.

The US imperialists have perpetrated all sorts of brutalities in Korea. It is not because they have a spark of humanity in them that so far they have not used the atom bomb in Korea. They cannot use the atom bomb in Korea because it will no longer produce any effective result and also for fear that should it be used it would bring a still greater international calamity on their heads.

As a matter of fact, the US imperialists have tried out every foul weapon in their possession in Korea. They are testing all the newly invented weapons in the Korean war, and have not hesitated to use poison gas and germ bombs.

By exposing each and every crime committed by the US imperialists, we should infuse our people with an even fiercer hatred for them.

Last, I would like to touch on the question of the armistice.

At present the US imperialists are dragging out the armistice talks. The main reason for this is that they are in an awkward dilemma. They have now three alternatives open before them. They have to decide whether to have a ceasefire, or maintain the present state of confrontation for long, or to spread the war into a big one similar to a third world war. They will have to make a choice out of these three alternatives.

Now let us first examine the question of their starting a big war. It can hardly be said that the US imperialists are fully prepared at the moment for a big war. Of course, the history of wars shows that even such aggressors as Hitler and Napoleon did not start wars fully prepared in every respect. They launched aggression while proceeding with their preparations for war. So there is no saying definitely that the US imperialists will not ignite a big war. But judging from the situation at present, they will not yet be able to start a third world war.

The next question is whether the US imperialists will be able to maintain the state of confrontation as it is now and continue the war. They are in a very difficult position to maintain the present state of

confrontation. The situation today is a far cry from that in October 1950. It is now utterly impossible for them to roll back the People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers and make inroads as far as the Chongchon River or the Amnok River again. It is also impossible for them to hold out as at present.

Since they cannot unleash a big war or drag out the present situation for long, the only alternative open to them now is truce. Why, then, do they put off the armistice?

First, they want a so-called "honourable truce," and are really desperate in their attempt to become victors when they are not.

But we demand a reasonable armistice. The US imperialists have failed ignominiously in their attempts to subjugate others, and yet they are trying to assume the role of victor. Why, then, should we be the losers when we have won? We can never back down.

The negotiations make little progress, because the US imperialists, in disregard of our reasonable proposal, are trying to have the people of the United States and the world believe that they have achieved an "honourable truce."

Second, the US monopoly capitalists are very much afraid that if an armistice is reached, they might

run up against great difficulties in selling their weapons. At the ceasefire negotiations the US side is acting entirely upon the instructions of the US monopoly capitalists. They have manufactured vast quantities of weapons. Should the war come to an end, they will not be able to dispose of all these weapons. Therefore, although they have come to the truce talks, they are none too pleased with the idea of an armistice. The US warmongers are interested in the presence of tensions and are frantically trying to aggravate them by all means.

On the one hand, the US warmongers are dragging out the truce talks, talking nonsense that “we want a truce, but can’t reach it because the Communist side demands too much,” or “the Communist army doesn’t want a truce,” while on the other hand they are putting pressure on Japan, West Germany, France and other satellite countries to purchase more US weapons. In so doing they are seeking to break the deadlock they are facing. This is another reason why they are delaying the ceasefire negotiations.

Third, the US imperialists fear that we might grow strong more rapidly than the enemy after the armistice. The enemy has examined and compared the forces of our Republic and the puppet Syngman Rhee

government before the war. Syngman Rhee had blustered all the time that should a war break out he would push as far as Mt Paektu within a few days. But when war did break out, the puppet Syngman Rhee army proved to be quite impotent and was crushed by a single blow from the People's Army. The US imperialists, too, have realized that we would grow more powerful with time.

So, they are weighing the advisability of allowing time to us and to the puppet Syngman Rhee clique alike by bringing about a ceasefire. It is obvious that with equal time on hand, our Republic which has the support of the people will develop and grow strong at a faster rate than the enemy.

The US imperialists' plan to rearm and use Japanese imperialism to invade Korea and China is also coming to naught. Today's China is People's China. Even when the Japanese imperialists fought against Nationalist China in the past, they failed to win eventually after eight years of exhausting struggle. So how can Japan, a subject state of the United States, win a battle with People's China? There is no doubt that China will develop and grow incomparably faster and stronger than Japan.

On comparing the Syngman Rhee clique with our

Republic, Japan with China and, further, the United States itself with the Soviet Union, the US imperialists find everything is hopeless after all, and so are hard pressed by the only alternative of an armistice. Yet, they are afraid of armistice.

The question of a ceasefire in Korea is now aggravating the discord between the State Department and the Defence Department of the United States, and also between the United States and Britain.

At present the US imperialists are delaying the truce talks on the pretext of exchanging POWs. If they want an armistice, it cannot make any difference to them whether they get a few more POWs back or not.

The trouble is that they want both to have an “honourable truce” in their favour and to continue to deal in arms. If such an ambition is not realized, they may possibly go on with the war.

What, then, should we be prepared for? We do not care if it is an armistice or a prolonged war. We do not fear a prolonged war. With us everything that could be destroyed has been destroyed. There is nothing more to be destroyed. Our people have all been toughened in the war, and know quite well how to fight against aircraft, too. There is no fear of our retreating as in 1950. Rather, our people want to drive the enemy out

of our territory and reunify the country even if it means waging a prolonged war. Even if an armistice is achieved, we must continue to fight for national reunification as long as the Yanks do not leave.

From the very outset of hostilities with the US imperialists, we were prepared for a long-drawn-out war.

Although we have equipped ourselves for a prolonged war, we need to make more thorough preparations to take better care of the people, to build munitions factories underground, and the like. Even in the present conditions of a grim war, we are training Party cadres and are sending students abroad for study, too. What can be there that is beyond our power?

Needless to say, we are not against an armistice. An armistice will be all the more welcome and favourable to us. During the armistice we will be able to prepare and supplement faster what we failed to prepare in the five years following liberation. So, we want an armistice. However, we do not fear a prolonged war or a big war either.

We must not relapse into a pacifist mood, merely pinning hopes on the truce talks, but push ahead energetically with preparations for the final victory in

a prolonged war. We should make efforts to get an armistice. But if an armistice is not concluded we must win victory in a prolonged war. Such is our political conclusion on the question of an armistice.

Even if an armistice is concluded we cannot regard it as a complete cessation of hostilities and take off our shoes and go to bed believing that peace has come. Because the thief will be staying in the next room as before. As I told the teaching staff of Kim Chaek Polytechnical Institute yesterday, an armistice is not a peace but literally a suspension of hostilities. Who can vouch that just because the hostilities have been suspended, the enemy will not pounce on us again?

Even when an armistice is achieved, we will be faced as ever with the national task of driving out the US imperialists and reunifying the country so long as they remain in occupation of the southern half of our country.

Therefore, even if an armistice is concluded, we should not relax in the least, but should find more efficient methods and shorter ways to do ten hours' work in one hour and ten days' task in one day, thereby quickly eliminating our shortcomings manifested in the war and making full preparations for beating off the enemy in the event of another big war.

By making more effective use of the ceasefire, we will have to build up our forces in every way.

Even though the country is not reunified, if a reasonable armistice is concluded as we insist, it will be a great victory for us.

First, the fact that the US imperialists have failed in their attempts to seize the whole of the northern half of Korea is in itself a victory for us. We have defended our revolutionary democratic base. As we have continually stated ever since liberation, the reunification and independence of the country requires a powerful revolutionary base. We have firmly defended such a base for national reunification.

Second, in the course of the war the strength of our People's Army has increased further, our cadres have grown up and our revolutionary forces have been augmented. During the war our cadres have learned to organize and guide the people.

Third, the fact that the US imperialists have been unable to win the war with a small country like Korea, has clearly shown to the whole world that there is no need to be afraid of them. In the Korean war the United States has lost its prestige completely. The fact that the Korean people heroically defended their country in the struggle against the US imperialists has

firmly persuaded the oppressed peoples throughout the world that if a people rise and fight in nationwide unity for the liberation of their country with the active support of the democratic camp, they can repulse any imperialism. Inspired by the struggle of the Korean people, the peoples of Iran, Egypt, Viet Nam, Malaya and many other countries, for instance, are now raising the flames of the national-liberation struggle still higher.

We demand an armistice and are striving for it. But it will not do to neglect preparations to cope with a prolonged war simply in the belief that an armistice will most certainly be reached.

We have not fulfilled the task of national reunification and have not routed and driven off the enemy completely. The task of reunifying the country and crushing the US imperialists and traitorous Syngman Rhee clique still remains. Therefore, if an armistice is concluded, we will have to work vigorously to utilize it to build up our revolutionary forces more rapidly.

KIM IL SUNG
THE WORKERS' PARTY OF
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