

KIM JONG IL'S THEORY ON KOREA'S REUNIFICATION

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EDITOR'S NOTE

Korea has been divided for over 60 years which have entailed a great loss to the Korean nation, subjecting them to manifold misfortunes and sufferings.

This tragic division of Korea, the last vestige of the Cold War of the 20th century, should not be tolerated any longer. The strong current of the Cold War has started losing its strength on the Korean peninsula, giving way to a warm current of national unity and reconciliation, the willpower of both north and south to reunify the country sweeping across the whole peninsula—a very important phase of epoch-making development, unprecedented in the history of Korea's division spanning over half a century.

This is clearly an outcome of the historic Pyongyang Meeting and the June 15 North-South Joint Declaration of June 2000.

At this phase of development Mr. Jang Sok, a Korean-American, after profound study and painstaking efforts, has brought out a book about General Kim Jong Il's idea and theory on Korea's reunification, titled, *Study of General Kim Jong Il's Theory on National Reunification*, a praiseworthy contribution of the writer to the cause of Korea's reunification.

The book was released in December 2001. Its contents are similar, in many respects, to those of the book titled, *Korea's Reunification—A Burning Question*, published by the Foreign Languages Publishing House in 1997. In view of this, the editorial board has decided to translate and publish only the new contents of this book.

PREFACE

Now we have entered the 21st century. Along with the passage of time the Korean nation has lived through years of heartrending pain. The word “division” is used to express all manner of national misfortunes and sufferings of Korea. “Reunification” has thus become the burning desire of the nation. As the former implies too much pain, too many tears and too deep and long-lasting bitterness of the nation, the entire Korean nation seems to be pinning every hope, every expectation and every meaning of life on the latter. All the Korean people in the north, south and abroad are calling for one country and one nation, at the tops of their voices.

In retrospect, the Korean people’s movement for reunification has travelled a road beset with difficulties yet full of pride, pushing its way unyieldingly and uninterruptedly through raging headwinds and gaining in strength constantly in spite of twists and turns, ebbs and flows.

Then there appeared a silver lining in the dark cloud of division, making room for the dawn of reunification and a bright sun shining all over—a dramatic change brought about by three days and two nights in June 2000, sparking fervour and enthusiasm for reunification.

Korean-Americans applauded the event as a breakthrough for reunification. All were aflame with the emotional feeling that reunification was around the corner. Yet, it is not an ephemeral emotion but a firm conviction and will, i.e., an ideological and theoretical weapon, which is required for achieving reunification, the supreme task of the nation.

Knowledge is power, essential to the forward movement.

The Koreans need to equip themselves with a scientific theory on reunification if they are to inspire themselves with an unfailing source of consciousness and engage in the reunification movement on clear-cut principles and in the right direction.

Inspired by my understanding of this point, I have written this book with a view to helping more and more people deepen their insight into the problem of reunification and gain a correct understanding of the history of the reunification movement.

Yet, poor as my qualifications and ability might be, I feel confident that this book will serve as nourishment, a tonic and a compass for all the aspirants to national reunification because of the great ideological and theoretical content and strong vitality of its subject—General Kim Jong Il's theory on national reunification.

Los Angeles
November 2001
Jang Sok

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1. KOREA IS ONE

“Korea is one”—this is the mindset required of every Korean in paving the way for national reunification. If one regards national reunification as the supreme national task assigned by history and time, and adopts the viewpoint of placing the nation above any ideology or system, and giving absolute priority to national homogeneity over heterogeneity, he or she will grasp the idea that Korea is undoubtedly one, even though different political ideas and systems exist in the north and the south, and the territory is divided.

However, if one is obsessed with the “theory of recognizing reality,” asserting that “Two different sovereign states exist in north and south,” it will be impossible to get rid of the anti-reunification theory and engage in the actual process of accelerating the reunification movement.

Therefore, if one is to successfully refute the “theory of national heterogeneity” claimed mainly by anti-reunification assertions and take an active part in the work for reunification, one must gain a profound knowledge of the very source of Kim Jong Il’s strong conviction with regard to reunification—“Korea is one”—and its historic meaning. This is vital to the study of Kim Jong Il’s outlook on reunification.

One Korea

Manifold difficulties still remain in the way to Korea’s reunification in spite of the enormous amount of blood, time and energy spent for the purpose.

Some Koreans are pessimistic about reunification,

regarding it as, at best, a distant event, while some make the defeatist remark that reunification is impossible for one generation to achieve. Worse still, some conclude that reunification is impossible, basing their argument on an understanding that Korea's division is the reflection of the equilibrium of power on the Korean peninsula, where capitalism and socialism are in direct contradiction. All these attitudes are casting dark clouds over reunification.

Kim Jong Il has pointed out that the pessimistic assertion with regard to Korea's reunification is, after all, the reflection of the ideological tendency of the people with only flimsy confidence in "one Korea."

Korea is one—this is the very source of General Kim Jong Il's strong conviction with regard to reunification—a conviction based on the viewpoint that Korea can survive when reunited into one, but cannot when divided.

In the divided land of Korea a genuine patriot worthy of the name is a person with an outlook that Korea is on no account two but one, and patriotism separated from reunification is inconceivable. This is Kim Jong Il's attitude to the motherland and patriotism, and the background of his conviction that Korea is one. His conviction conforms to Korea's history and reality, and originates from his Juche-orientated attitude that one's problem must be solved through one's own judgement and endeavour.

The viewpoint that Korea is one is, above all, based on the principle that one nation means one country, not two. Even if the Korean people are living separately in the north and the south, and under different systems, they are still one nation, which must form one country, and never two. In Korea, where the people make up a homogeneous nation, and not several tribes living on the same land, and with a history of over 5 000

years, the concept of either nation or country means one and the same thing.

In the light of this, the assertion that the countrymen in the north and the south are strangers to each other, with the nation having become heterogeneous, pointing to decades of division as an excuse for this claim, is grossly mistaken, while the opinion that the country itself has been separated into two different states holds no water. All these arguments are tantamount to insulting their forebears and denying Korea's history of a long tradition as a single nation and state, sinning against the generations to come.

Therefore, Kim Jong Il's conviction that Korea is one represents the conviction of the Korean nation, the conviction of historic times.

The approach that Korea is one is, in addition, the viewpoint and conclusive attitude of understanding and judging the question of Korea's reunification, the question of the Korean nation, from the independent standpoint of the driving force of the Korean nation. The assertion that "It is a foregone conclusion that there exist two different sovereign states on the Korean peninsula, an objective reality recognized by the international community," is the outcome of a misconception devoid of independent judgement, a mode of considering the exclusive question of the Korean nation itself from a borrowed viewpoint in favour of a foreign attitude.

As for the fact that many countries have diplomatic relations with both the north and the south of Korea, it is merely a reflection of the abnormal situation of Korea's division. This is a passing phenomenon which will be over when Korea is reunified. The clamour about "two Koreas" based on the viewpoint of the internal problem of the nation from the perspective of international relations is a traitorous remark.

The conviction that Korea is one is also motivated by ardent love for the country and the nation. Kim Jong Il's standpoint, from which he flatly rejects the "two Koreas" theory and always thinks of only one Korea, mirrors his ardent love for his country and fellow countrymen, love expressed in his pain over the misfortune of the divided nation and his intention to cast his lot with the country, his deep concern about the country and his burning agony over the fate of his motherland, which lead him to work wholeheartedly for one Korea.

From the late 1980s and early 1990s overseas Koreans began to use the words "southern country" and "northern country," an indication of their strong conviction that both north and south form one country. It is quite natural that youth and students in the south are raising the cry "From Mt. Halla to Mt. Paektu, From Mt. Paektu to Mt. Halla—Korea is one" and their viewpoint has taken root in the general understanding of the people of all walks of life in the south.

Kim Jong Il's strong conviction that "Korea is one" is the belief enshrined in the minds of the Korean people during this period of time full of misfortunes caused by national division.

One Nation

Kim Jong Il's conviction that "Korea is one" covers not only a geographical concept that Korea is a one territory handed down from generation to generation, but also a socio-historical concept that Korea is also a single nation that has lived on from generation to generation on the same land.

"Blood is thicker than water" is an adage accepted by the Korean nation in the throes of national division as the truth of life and nature, and not as a mere form of empty words.

There exist on the Korean peninsula not two different nations in the north and the south in direct confrontation with one another but one nation living divided on the same land due to the intervention of a foreign power.

As mentioned above, Korea is a homogenous nation that has carried its bloodline throughout history, speaking the same language and living on the same land for thousands of years. All the Koreans in the north, the south, or abroad, are the same nation linked by the blood and soul of the Paedal nation and by the community of national interests, mentality and sentiments.

No force can split this homogeneous nation, formed and developed through a long historic period, or obliterate its national character.

The tragic twists and turns to which this nation has been subjected by its division into the north and the south constitute only a temporary phenomenon in view of its national history of over 5 000 years.

The reunion as one nation of Korea, forcibly and temporarily divided by a foreign power, is a law-governed requirement for its national development and an inevitable historical trend.

Korea is, by any measure, one nation, not two, which is another aspect of Kim Jong Il's conviction that "Korea is one."

Certain elements, with either a lackadaisical approach or attitude of opposition to reunification, however, are exclusively stressing national heterogeneity as the main point of argument to justify their unreasonable position.

The characteristic assertion running through the argument of "national heterogeneity" resolves itself into approximately the following two points:

The first point is that community of blood and language alone cannot define Korea as a single nation. The message is

that the national community between the north and the south only remains in terms of blood and language, and nothing more; the community of blood and language alone cannot justify the claim for the reunification of Korea for the sole reason that it is the same nation. This means, in short, that the populations of the north and the south cannot be identified as the same nation, as they have diverged with the passing of time.

This assertion is immediately refuted by the stark reality of the strong national feeling, rather than by logic. For example, when a single team composed of players from both the north and the south of Korea took part in the world table-tennis championships held in Japan and won a gold medal in the women's team competition for the first time, the entire Korean nation was afire with joy and emotion. The minds of the people in the north and the south were aflame with the strong feeling that they are of the same nation.

The above-mentioned assertion is also refuted sufficiently from the logical point of view. The unreasonable aspect of the assertion about "national heterogeneity" is proved by the fact that community of blood and language is invariable vis-a-vis community of residence, cultural and economic life. The fact that community of blood and language is characteristically perpetual in comparison with other indices marking a nation means that this community is really the basic element of uniting people as a nation and the major factor sustaining the national character and consciousness. Acting on the background of the sense of solidarity and fraternity among members of a nation is the consciousness of compatriotic feeling issuing from the community of blood and language.

The second point of the assertion about "national heterogeneity" is that the Korean people's national characteris-

tics remain basically unchanged in the south, but they have qualitatively changed in the north. But this is unreasonable because the advocates of this assertion are measuring the so-called “change” of north Korea by the yardstick of the “present situation” of south Korea.

One or two examples are sufficient to prove the absurdity of their assertion. As far as language as a symbol of the national spirit is concerned, north Korea formulated a thoroughgoing policy to preserve the native language immediately after Korea’s liberation, and has been pursuing it consistently up to the present. Conversely, in south Korea the native language in both writing and speaking is being corrupted by foreign, mainly American-English and Japanese, words and expressions.

Important yardsticks of estimation essential to the discussion of the “heterogeneity” of the north and the south are whether the leadership of both sides is made up of patriots who engaged in the anti-Japanese struggle for Korea’s liberation or traitors who supported Japan or committed treason during Japan’s military rule in Korea; which side has kept up the national spirit in the face of domination and subjugation by foreign forces. These would be the most fundamental standards of estimating the nation as a whole collective unit of consideration.

Viewed from these two standards, it is obvious to everyone that the north follows a system of national independent and patriotic values, whereas the south is governed by an order and system of values geared to dependence on foreign forces and treachery to the nation.

This difference between the north and the south in characteristics and value system makes it possible to easily estimate the essence of the assertion about “heterogeneity.”

Some people, including the proponents of the “heterogeneous character of north Korea,” maintain that north Korea’s “heterogeneity” is an obstacle to Korea’s reunification. But the real barrier is the Americanization and Japanization of south Korea.

Over the long period of national division since Korea’s liberation both the north and the south have undergone changes in all areas of politics, the economy and culture, changes different from one side to the other. In this sense, it may be asserted that both sides have become “heterogeneous.” Yet, national homogeneity and community in terms of blood and language, as well as other aspects, overwhelm the heterogeneity and differences of both sides, and the sense of solidarity and national feeling aroused by community of blood indicates that both the north and the south are of the same nation.

Conclusively, Kim Jong Il’s conviction that “Korea is one” is significant from the point of view of its historic meaning and its theoretical and practical aspects, in that it makes it possible to correct misunderstanding and the anti-reunification viewpoint which stresses the aspect of heterogeneity of the nation exclusively, rather than its homogeneity, and to take a pro-reunification viewpoint and attitude that Korea is one.

2. ATTITUDE TOWARDS OTHER NATIONS CONCERNED

If one is to understand the pre-eminence and validity of Kim Jong Il’s idea of national independence, it is necessary as well to consider the question of Korea’s reunification from the perspective of international politics.

Needless to say, the key to solving the problem of reunification is to resolve the mutual relations between the two sides of the divided nation by the efforts of internal forces. Yet, the process will not be smooth unless it is considered in relation to international politics. This is because Korea's reunification is an internal problem of the Korean nation and a matter of national independence, and, at the same time, a matter not independent of international politics but related to it closely.

In view of the fact that the division of the Korean peninsula was caused by foreign forces and the process of its aggravation was expedited by foreign forces and the great obstacle to the reunification is the foreign interference and domination, in other words, foreign forces are the most responsible for the division, it is necessary to make a deep study of Kim Jong Il's attitude towards other nations concerned.

Attaching importance only to the international aspect, that is, the influence of foreign powers, and disregarding the internal aspect of the nation in the matter of reunification is, of course, a mistaken, sycophantic attitude. And taking no account of the relations with neighbouring countries involved in the matter of reunification is also a wrong attitude.

The Korean people have to cope actively and suitably with the changing international political situation in relation to the Korean peninsula from the standpoint of national independence, so as to find a successful solution to the complicated problem of reunification.

In this context, Kim Jong Il's attitude to the nations concerned with Korea's reunification has to be studied and understood as an important part of the whole system of his theory of reunification that indicates an effective policy for Korea's reunification, rather than as the direction of foreign policy of the north Korean government.

**1) Attitude towards the United States:
It Should Give Up Position of Strength
and Be Faithful to Its Commitments
and Obligations**

US Asia-Pacific Centrism and Korean Peninsula

It may be necessary now to find out the cause of division; yet what assumes a more practical meaning is the point why Korea alone should remain in the world as a divided country, a divided nation, now that all the formerly divided countries have been reunified following the end of the Cold War.

Studying Kim Jong Il's attitude towards the nations concerned with Korea's reunification, with a full understanding of this point, will enable one to understand how important it is to make a correct judgment of the position, strategy and policy of the neighbouring powers with regard to Korea.

Let me start with the current new foreign policy pursued by the United States.

A most characteristic about-face in US foreign policy following the detente in the late 20th century concerns its Asia-Pacific centrism in contrast to its policy of Eurocentrism during the Cold War. With the accelerated process of European integration and the collapse of the former Soviet Union and the East European socialist countries, the US "role," once powerful during the Cold War, dissipated, driving the United States out of Europe to all intents and purposes. The switchover of US foreign policy (world strategy) to Asia-Pacific centrism offers a basis for analyzing the future of the US troops in south Korea and the changing US policy towards Korea.

The United States still considers the presence of its army in

south Korea necessary for the maintenance of its hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region. According to its viewpoint, its army in south Korea in the period of the Cold War was the main combat force checking the Far East strategy of the former Soviet Union and the military power of north Korea, and still serves as a symbol of its strength in Korea and Northeast Asia.

Noteworthy in this regard is an analysis by a journalist that the United States considers it inevitable to deploy its army as close as possible to the areas vital to its interests in order to demonstrate its “commitments to security” and regards the forward deployment of its troops as a symbol of great political importance. This is also the core of US military strategy. Therefore, it is hard to expect an early withdrawal of the US army from south Korea. In view of this fact, the about-face in the US global strategy following the end of the Cold War will not bring about any remarkable change in the status of its forces in south Korea. This means that the US forces in south Korea will remain as a negative factor in creating conditions for Korea’s reunification.

The most controversial theme among the Koreans in the current analysis of international situation is the improvement of relations between north Korea and the United States. Does the current Bush administration want to improve its relations with north Korea? What influence would the improvement of north Korea-US bilateral relations have on Korea’s reunification?

Answers to the afore-mentioned questions are important for understanding the real message of Kim Jong Il’s attitude to the nations concerned with Korea’s reunification.

It seems appropriate to approach this matter from the question as to why the United States bothers so much about north Korea. It would be reasonable to think that the recent US policy of attaching importance to north Korea derives from the Asia-Pacific centrism of the US.

As far as this matter is concerned, it should be acknowledged that the US strategic perspective of Korea and its hegemonistic attitude to China and the position of north Korea in present-day international politics should be re-evaluated from the standpoint of national independence.

It is common knowledge that for more than one hundred years the United States has been keeping its Korea policy focused on Korea's strategic value. It has been constantly seeking a way to dominate the whole of Korea throughout the course of pursuing its global strategy based on Eurocentrism during the Cold War and its current new foreign policy acknowledged as Asia-Pacific centrism.

The US fiasco in policy-making is evident in its misjudgment of north Korea's position and role in Northeast Asia, and also in world politics. In international relations north Korea has emerged not as a mere holder of the "casting vote" but as a power in the centre of international politics—a fact eloquently proved by Kim Jong Il's visits to China in May 2000 and in January 2001, and to the Russian Federation between July and August 2001, which evoked great repercussions worldwide.

The United States is oversensitive about north Korea, almost to the point of paranoia, because it is very worried about Kim Jong Il's military strategy towards it and the might of his Songun politics which is neutralizing its strategy for the domination of the whole of Korea, or at least its policy for the domination of south Korea.

It is necessary to further study this question. Following the emergence of the Clinton administration of the Democrats, the United States pursued a liberal foreign policy of combining a hardline attitude and dialogue and negotiations with north Korea, an attitude which was softer than the intransigent

military and political attitude of the previous Bush (elder) administration of the Republicans.

True, the United States developed its relations with north Korea according to its long-term plan of bringing north Korea towards “reform” and “opening.” It is also obvious that it made diplomatic contacts with north Korea on the basis of its actual recognition of the sound political stability of north Korea under Kim Jong Il’s leadership. However, the Clinton administration did not take any tangible step to lift its blockade against north Korea. Meanwhile, it continued its military threat through its stepped-up US-south Korea joint military exercises. The soft attitude implicit in north Korea policy of the Clinton administration was not consistent all the time for it was affected by the backlash from the “hawkish” elements in the US Congress and military circles. This indicates two aspects: The so-called changeover from “containment and confrontation strategy” to “engagement and enlargement strategy” in the US policy towards north Korea after the “detente” did not mean complete abandonment of its “containment and confrontation strategy”; the Clinton administration, which had already admitted to the limit of its “power policy” in the course of its nuclear blackmail against north Korea, arrived at the conclusion that it was not possible to bring north Korea under its control by means of force. These two aspects need to be considered from the dialectical point of view.

As far as the “engagement and enlargement strategy” was concerned, the essential aspect of the strategic concept of “enlargement” was brought to light in the remark, titled, *From Containment to Enlargement*, made by Anthony Lake, once a White House national security advisor during the term of office of the Clinton administration. Joseph Nye, Jr., who, as Assistant Secretary

of Defence for International Security Affairs, had taken a hand in both the formulation of this strategic concept bringing the White House and State Department together and the other channel of the process, drew a clear picture of the strategic concept of “engagement” in his report, entitled, *United States Security Strategy for the East Asia and Pacific Region*, released in February 1995. The core of this “engagement strategy” of the US Defence Department is that the United States would abandon its second-phase plan (1993-1994) for reduction of its army in south Korea and maintain it for a decade in the future. It would also maintain its 100 000 troops deployed forward in East Asia, including 37 000 troops in south Korea, 45 000 troops in Japan and marine support troops of the 7th Fleet. The strategy also includes the idea of setting up a multinational security consultation body in Northeast Asia.

The United States, which emerged as an unbridled “dinosaur” after the collapse of Cold-War system, has been pursuing its strategy for “globalization.” “Globalization” is a new strategy formulated by strategists in Washington and international financial capitalists in Wall Street to control and manage the post-Cold War world. The optimum place the United States has selected for success in this strategy aimed at “opening” and “reform” is the Korean peninsula, which is vital to its interests. It is now demanding “opening” and “reform” from both the north and south of Korea.

Embroided in a foreign exchange crisis, or a major financial crisis, south Korea placed itself in December 1997 under the control of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), a key undertaker of the “globalization” strategy, opening its economy wide and leaving its wealth at the mercy of supranational capital. It is noted that taking of power by reformists in south Korea is inseparably related to the US “globalization” strategy.

The US “globalization” strategy has set its aim at north Korea, demanding “opening” and “reform” from the latter. North Korea is flatly refusing this demand. The “nuclear crisis in Korea” in 1993 and 1994 originated in a frontal confrontation between the United States and north Korea, the former demanding the opening of the latter’s nuclear facilities and the latter refusing. The US National Security Council session held at the White House went to the length of discussing its final decision to attack north Korea that had rejected the US demand.

This notwithstanding, the United States was compelled to come to the negotiation table, and reached the Geneva agreement with north Korea in October 1994. The United States had realized that if it went to war against north Korea it would suffer a great loss. Had the United States considered the north Korea’s war capability to be as low as that of Iraq, the Korean peninsula would not have avoided war in 1994.

As for north Korea’s diplomatic strategy which compelled the United States to sit at negotiation table, officials concerned in south Korea call it a “negotiations and co-existence strategy.” Nevertheless, that north Korea was pursuing a strategy for negotiations with the United States did not mean, as a matter of course, that it had given up its class position towards the latter. Its main objective in forcing the United States to the negotiation table by drawing on its “negotiation and co-existence strategy” was not to take a measure to break through its economic difficulties by adopting an “open” policy, but to open a decisive phase in the settlement of the reunification problem, the key issue for the entire Korean nation.

In the meantime, hardliners who had been advocating nullification of the Geneva agreement and even war against north Korea, drove the Clinton administration out of the White

House, and George W. Bush (younger) of the Republicans assumed the presidency. This caused another twist in the US policy towards north Korea. Bush and his diplomatic and security advisors, entertaining an extraordinary attachment to the interests of the US munitions industries, have been pursuing a new “Cold-War” confrontation policy based on “power diplomacy,” while making ill-designed outrageous speeches, freezing north Korea-US and inter-Korean relations.

The Bush administration is carried away, almost demented, with arrogance based on its doctrine of “US supremacy.” This doctrine, which appeared after the breakdown of the Cold-War system and the US’s overwhelming victory in the Gulf War—many military experts estimate that the US victory in the war against Iraq was exaggerated by CNN and other Western mass media—asserts that American values and systems are the best in the world. The doctrine puts special stress on “strength.” Hence, Bush and his diplomatic and security coterie have been stressing the importance of military build-up and power diplomacy. This position of the Bush administration is evident in its claim that it would put the process of its national missile defence system in top gear, taking issue with north Korea’s “nuclear and ICBM development.” Simultaneously, it is making a unilateral demand that development and production of missiles be stopped in north Korea. Such a new Cold-War north Korea policy of the Bush administration is pouring cold water on the atmosphere of dialogue and cooperation on the Korean peninsula, an atmosphere created as a result of the historic Pyongyang Meeting and June 15 North-South Joint Declaration. For this reason, the United States, responsible for the division of Korea, is now open to criticism for playing a negative role once again in the efforts of the Korean people for reconciliation, cooperation and reunification.

Moreover, the Bush administration's abandonment of "win-win strategy" and its follow-up formulation of a new military strategy with the focus set on the Korean peninsula is arousing serious apprehension. In connection with this, an American newspaper carried an article that made a point that the abandonment of the "win-win strategy" was the outcome of an idea on the re-disposition of US military forces with north Korea as the target.

According to a reliable diplomatic source, even if the United States officially renounces its so-called "win-win strategy" the gist of which is to achieve victories in simultaneous wars against two enemy states, and accordingly reviews its overseas forces comprehensively, there would be no change in the status of US troops in Asia. The source was quoted as saying that the US Defence Department was known to have renounced the so-called "win-win strategy" and formulated a new strategic arrangement, according to which it was examining from various angles a plan for appropriate re-disposition and reduction of about 1.4 million overseas US troops. The source added, however, that in view of the Bush administration's policy of attaching importance to Asia, though there were different opinions in some quarters, no change could be expected in the status of US troops in Asia, including those in south Korea. In his briefing at an unofficial session of the House Committee of Armed Services Donald Rumsfeld, the then Secretary of the Defence Department of the Bush administration, made it clear that a new, flexible military strategy was in the making on the premise that an unexpected emergency like the Korean war or Iraq's attack on Kuwait was inevitable.

In a document on review of plans for the future (threat, strategy, policy, scale of military power, and structure,) handed out to the attendants at the briefing, Rumsfeld explained the necessity of the "capability of flexible reaction to uncertain situations" and the

objective of abandonment of the “win-win strategy.” It is obvious to everyone that the core of the “uncertain situations” was the possibility of a military clash between north Korea and the United States.

Boundaries of the US “Power Policy” and the Commitments to Be Carried Out by the United States

Given hereunder is a piece of information which brought about a dramatic turn in the stream of history, information which became widely known for the reason that it prevented the possible outbreak of a north Korea-US war at the eleventh hour in 1994.

The *Washington Post*, dated April 13, 1995, reported that in May 1994 the United States had made a concrete review of the possibility of an all-out war against north Korea, involving the use of tactical nuclear weapons and mobilization of hundreds of thousands of troops, held a simulation of an attack on north Korea’s nuclear facilities, and examined the deployment of an additional 10 000 troops in south Korea. It conducted a simulation of a new Korean war at Los Alamos National Laboratory in the presence of a senior advisor to Defence Secretary Perry, a senior official of the Defence Department, a key senator and nuclear weapons experts. While explaining several military plans to President Clinton on May 19, Perry and Gary Luck, commander of the US army in south Korea, reported that the outbreak of a new Korean war would entail the loss of one million human lives, economic losses to the tune of one trillion US dollars (three times south Korea’s 1994 GNP) and the loss of 80 000 to 100 000 US troops.

The Korean question is a military one to be solved with the

United States, the military “superpower”—this is Kim Jong Il’s unique viewpoint, in the background of which lie his judgment of the situation, understanding of history and independent outlook on the nation.

According to his clear-sighted judgment, from the historical point of view, the diplomacy of the United States is “power diplomacy,” namely, an undisguised “gunboat diplomacy,” which has been expressed in the form of military and political intervention in and control of the internal affairs of other countries.

So long as the United States has the military prerogative in south Korea and the US army remains stationed there, the Korean question resolves itself naturally into a military question to be solved with the United States. And as the United States was a belligerent party during the Korean war (June 25, 1950 to July 27, 1953) and is still pursuing military confrontation with north Korea across the Military Demarcation Line, the Korean question is purely a military question involving the United States. In the light of this, the Korean question boils down to confrontation between Kim Jong Il’s independent military strategy and US power policy.

Kim Jong Il’s independent military strategy is based on his absolute trust in the might of the single-hearted unity of the north Korea’s People’s Army and people, and his full knowledge of the excellent character of the Korean nation. A most salient historic character of the Korean nation is that it has never invaded a foreign country, and, at the same time, has offered a lasting, victorious resistance to any aggression by any other country or nation. Kim Jong Il’s understanding of this history runs throughout his independent military strategy.

According to Kim Myong Chol, a military commentator in Japan, Kim Jong Il considers it necessary to have an independent military strategy just for the protection and

maintenance of national sovereignty and for national reunification. To expand on this, he regards the strategy as vital to bringing pressure to bear upon the United States, which makes arbitrary use of its global strategy for domination and intervention, so that eventually it will come to recognize the ineffectuality of its military intervention and threats, and be forced to agree to political consultation on the establishment of diplomatic relations and the signing of a peace agreement between north Korea and the United States.

Therefore, Kim Jong Il's military strategy is one guaranteeing the peaceful reunification of Korea by means of force, and defeating the enemy without a war and achieving a bloodless victory.

Defeating the enemy without a war is the core of his strategy.

He has turned north Korea into a fortress, not to provoke a war but to prevent the outbreak of a war.

The United States is apt to attack any opponent which it considers weak. It brands the challengers to its domination as "rogue states" or "gangster states" to justify its military action against them. The best way of defence against such an animal as the United States is to get ready to counterattack as a hedgehog would do.

The point in question is that even if one side pursues a policy of bringing its opponent to its knees without a war, it is uncertain whether the policy can produce its due effect on the other side that regards war as its mode of existence.

The reality, however, shows that the United States has gone down on its knees before north Korea from time to time.

Timeline:

The United States wrote a letter of apology for the *Pueblo*

incident that occurred on January 23, 1968.

It gave up its military retaliation when its reconnaissance plane, *EC-121*, was brought down on April 15, 1969.

When the tree-felling incident occurred in Panmunjom on August 18, 1976, it patched up the dispute by agreeing to the division of the joint security area.

The “suspicion of north Korea’s development of nuclear weapons” in the period 1993 to 1994 was brought to an end with the United States signing a nuclear agreement on October 21, 1994.

The “suspicion of underground nuclear facilities in Kumchang-ri” was also dispelled in August 1998, with the United States having paid 300 million dollars for a visit to the suspected areas in Kumchang-ri.

One of the key elements of Kim Jong Il’s military strategy is to possess the poisonous sting of a scorpion (*General Kim Jong Il’s Strategy for Reunification*, authored by Kim Myong Chol), i.e., the capability of launching long-range, mass-destruction weapons such as ICBMs, striking terror into the United States while avoiding an arms race with the latter.

Any US military action against north Korea would be the same as envisaged in Operation Plan 5027.

Noteworthy in the content and character of Operation Plan 5027-98 are the following:

With its army deployed throughout the world, the United States is pursuing its world strategy through its regional headquarters—the European Command, Atlantic Command, Pacific Command, South Command and Middle East Command—and functional support headquarters, including the Space War Command and Special War Command. The numerical symbol of the Pacific Command is “5.” Of

the areas under the charge of the Pacific Command, the Korean peninsula is marked by the numerical symbol “027.” The figure “5” of Operation Plan 5027-98 indicates the Pacific Command, and “027” means the plan is to be applied to the Korean peninsula. The figure “98” marks the year 1998 when the plan was revised.

Operation Plan 5027-98 is phased in six stages:

The first stage is a pre-emptive strike, and its targets are north Korea’s munitions factories, airports, naval ports and special forces, and its capital city of Pyongyang. The special areas suspected of being nuclear facilities are certainly on the list of attack. The attack will take place from both the sky and sea. As far as the air operations are concerned, F-117 Stealth bombers, B-1 and B-2 bombers in Langley Air Force Base, Virginia, in the US proper will make sorties within 24 hours, supported by KC refueling planes, and return to base. Then fighter bombers of the 5th Air Force will make a sortie from the US base in Yokota, Japan. Planes of the 7th Air Force at the US base in Osan, south Korea, will also take off. South Korean F-15, F-16 fighters will provide air cover for the planes of the US Air Force in action and throw north Korea’s radar network into confusion. At the same time, submarines will leave Pearl Harbour in Hawaii and be on standby in the open sea, and a task force of the aircraft carriers *Kitty Hawk* and *Constellation*, carrying 80 fighter bombers each, will get ready for operations in the sea areas off Korea. The United States will launch thousands of Tomahawk cruise missiles at targets in north Korea any time it considers appropriate. Bunker busters will be used. Immediately after the outbreak of the war, the concentrated thrust of the US air force and navy would paralyse Pyongyang. North Korea has the largest anti-aircraft dispositions in the world, with 9 000 23mm automatic artillery guns and five kinds of surface-to-air missiles—including SA-2 medium- and long-range missiles, SA-3 medium-range missiles, SA-5 long-range missiles with a range of 300km, SA-7 portable missiles for infantrymen and improved SA-16

missiles. The United States will attempt to jam the enemy's surface-to-air missiles by mobilizing its electronic jamming aircraft. However, AA guns are unaffected by electronic waves as they are hand-operated. So the timing of an attack will be set for a moonless night for protection of the US fighter bombers from north Korea's AA guns.

The second stage is the period of neutralizing the impact of north Korea's counterattack at the outset. North Korea has set up a battery of 200 multiple-launch rockets of 240mm calibre, and about 10 600 guns of all types along the demarcation line. This battery, estimated as the best in the world in terms of density, includes Seoul in its target area. If it is set in full motion for half an hour, firing 100 000 shells, it can turn Seoul into a sea of fire several times over. In consideration of the fact that 90 percent of the US army in south Korea and the south Korean armed forces are concentrated within the range of 50km around the demarcation line, the core of the second-stage strategy is to paralyse or at least remarkably weaken the function of this emplacement.

Needless to say, this battery is located deep underground. Therefore, the United States would only be able to deploy its ground forces on a full scale after weeks of bloody fighting between the main forces of the north Korean army and the south Korean army, namely, immediately after the ground forces of north Korea have sustained a "decisive blow." The main force of the south Korean army would suffer just as much, yet, it would go through its rearrangement along with the US army deployed later.

The third stage is rearrangement of forces for offensive operations.

The United States would deploy 210 000 troops in all to south Korea. The first dispatch would be composed of the 24th Division in Hawaii, the 1st Corps in Port Louise, the 3rd Corps in Texas, the 3rd Division of Marines in Okinawa, the 2nd Division and the 3rd Brigade in Seattle, all under the command of the Pacific Army Command. The

5th Air Force in Yokota, the 11th Air Force in Alaska and the 13th Air Force in Guam, under the command of the Pacific Air Force Command, would take off for Korea.

The 7th Fleet in Yokota under the command of the Pacific Navy Command and the fleets in California and North Carolina would sail towards Korea. All forces of the Pacific Command are expected to be massed in and around Korea in no more than 20 days.

When the forward deployment and rearrangement of forces were finalized, there would be a rapid turn for the fourth stage of breaking through the demarcation line and rushing northward. The offensive would take place in the sky and on the land simultaneously. The 3rd Division of the US Marines and the south Korean seaborne troops, supported by the US Air Force and aircraft-carrier task forces, would make a landing in their designated areas of Nampho and Wonsan in north Korea. After landing, the troops would advance to Pyongyang. At the same time the south Korean air-borne troops would land by parachute around Pyongyang.

Thus, the United States would capture Pyongyang.

After gaining control of Pyongyang, the United States would move into the fifth stage, committing its forces towards the Amnok and Tuman rivers.

Having taken full control of north Korea, the United States would institute a military administration system, entering the sixth stage of its actual rule in north Korea.

The duration of time which the United States has calculated to take up to this stage is 48 days at the earliest and 120 days at the latest.

The above-mentioned is the content of Operation Plan 5027-98, which is different from previous war plans in two aspects:

First, it has adopted the concept of “pre-emptive strike” for the first time. In place of the previous clause, “When a war breaks out in Korea,” which was equivocal as to who would provoke the war, it has

openly chosen the expression, “When a war breaks out upon a pre-emptive strike by the US army.”

Secondly, it has extended the “line of demarcation for its northward march.” The limit of its northward march which the previous plans fixed at the “Chongchon River-Wonsan” line in consideration of China, has been extended up to the Amnok and Tuman rivers, meaning the occupation of the whole of north Korea.

The United States which has no enemy to be afraid of now that the Soviet Union has collapsed, and which has shown its aggressive nature and military supremacy through its merciless destruction of Yugoslavia and Iraq, has put the final touch to its plan for war in Korea. According to the August 1999 edition of the magazine *Min*, published by the National Association for Democratic National Reunification in south Korea, General John Tillery, Commander of the US army in south Korea, stated on February 3, 1999, to the House Committee of Armed Services that north Korea is the most likely country to be able to fight an all-out war with the United States in the near future.

Meanwhile, north Korea’s counterattack would not be confined to intercepting the US fighter bombers or Tomahawk missiles by missiles and AA guns.

North Korea, which is totally different from what it was during the Korean war, would readily launch a long-distance retaliatory offensive by means of its IRBMs, MRBMs and ICBMs, destroying US bases in Japan and major Japanese political and military strongholds, as well as bases in the US proper. It is as clear as daylight that the United States would sustain terrible human and material damage if its political and military strategic points were attacked by north Korean missiles. If one recalls the September 11 incident, when Washington and New York were attacked by four passenger

planes, it will not be difficult to estimate how terrible and tragic the consequences would be from an attack by ICBMs on the US mainland. Worse still, the United States has 102 atomic power stations and Japan has 51 atomic power stations, all in operation and with no protection ensured from an attack. If any one of them were to explode under an attack, fallout with an amount of radioactivity equalling that of 150-180 hydrogen bombs would result.

According to The International Herald Tribune, dated February 3, 1994, Paul Leventhal, president of the US Nuclear Control Institute, said that if north Korea launched a retaliatory attack it would give rise to multiple Chernobyl-type nuclear holocausts simultaneously.

In contrast, north Korea has set up a complete air-raid shelter system not only in Pyongyang but throughout the country, with the world's best battery of AA weapons made up of long-range and short-range surface-to-air missiles and all kinds of guns. Its close network of underground structures capable of withstanding a nuclear attack can provide maximum protection for the military personnel and citizens from the destructive power of nuclear weapons.

Also available in cities like Pyongyang is a system whereby all the inhabitants can take shelter underground within half an hour without any inconvenience.

In short, thanks to Kim Jong Il's military strategy, north Korea is in possession of the capability to withstand a US pre-emptive nuclear strike and launch a retaliatory attack on the US proper and Japan. No one would ever think that the United States would dare provoke a war against such an opponent.

The result of the computer simulation of a north Korea-US

war in 1994 compelled the United States to give up the idea of a war with north Korea; likewise, even if north Korea's attack on the US proper might not be expected, the Americans would on no account risk a Korean war that would entail the loss of 100 000 GIs and war costs to the tune of one trillion dollars. The national feeling in the United States would obviously be an obstacle to war-mongers, protagonists of a new Cold-War confrontation. Moreover, the Iraq war and air raids on Yugoslavia revealed that the much-vaunted US hi-tech weapons, including Stealth bombers, Tomahawk cruise missiles, Patriot interceptor missiles and Apache gunships (the so-called "tank killers") are not as trustworthy as expected.

All the afore-mentioned points indicate the limitations of the US "power policy."

It is a historical precept that an unjust war cannot prevail over a just war, and the violence of invaders cannot defeat the resistance of the masses of the people.

In the confrontation between Zeus and Prometheus, the so-called first duel for life, Prometheus who had brought fire to mankind was defeated; Zeus punished Prometheus, chaining him to a crag and sending an eagle to eat his liver, which grew again only to be devoured over and over. The United States, the self-proclaimed "Zeus" of modern times, however, has suffered defeat in each bout of confrontation with north Korea, which has shed the light of the Juche idea on mankind.

Kim Jong Il's military strategy serves as a powerful deterrent to the US "power policy."

The United States should draw a lesson from its previous failures and fiascos.

In October 1994 the United States signed the Geneva agreement whereby it made commitments to the following, on the premise of north Korea's freeze on nuclear facilities at

Nyongbyon: lifting of economic sanctions against north Korea; normalization of diplomatic relations with north Korea; official provision of no use and not even a threat of use of nuclear weapons against north Korea; provision to north Korea of 2 000 MW(e)-capacity light-water reactor plants and annual supply of 500 000 tons of substitute energy until the target date of 2003.

Kim Jong Il's demand that the United States should be faithful to its commitments and obligations bound by the Geneva agreement, is just. Also reasonable is the demand for improvement of bilateral relations between north Korea and the United States.

As afore-mentioned, however, since the Bush administration came to power, north Korea-US relations have relapsed to freezing point, to the phase of antagonism or confrontation. Then, which side is in the better position as far as this confrontation is concerned?

It is the United States, it is analysed, which is in a disadvantageous situation in the confrontation between the two sides.

As is widely known, the US military strategy towards the Korean peninsula is characterized in two ways—confrontation on the one hand, and pre-emptive strike on the other when north Korea's weak point is detected.

The United States, however, is agonizing over the fact that it is not in a position to carry on indefinitely with either of these two ways, i.e., confrontation and war. It finds it impossible to reproduce in Korea such wars as it fought in the Persian Gulf and in the Balkan peninsula to dispose of the excessive amount of its arsenal and test the performance of its hi-tech weapons.

The reason is that north Korea, with which it is standing

face to face, is in possession of strong military forces with ICBMs capable of delivering nuclear warheads targeted at the US proper, with underground fortresses capable of withstanding US air raids, and with huge armed forces and people equipped with a self-sacrificing spirit and inspired by the consciousness of resistance against the US (*Min*, released in August 1999).

Another excruciating pain of the Bush administration is the year 2003, the fatal period of time, which has passed leaving the United States in non-compliance with the Geneva agreement. It can no longer keep its promise about LWR projects by the target date of 2003, and its promise about the lifting of economic sanctions and the normalization of diplomatic relations between the two sides looks impossible to be fulfilled in the current situation of bilateral relations between north Korea and the United States. Given this situation, the Bush administration will find it difficult to continually stick to its strategy of confrontation.

It is estimated that Kim Jong Il's Songun policy may nullify the US new Cold-War strategy for confrontation.

Therefore, the United States should, first of all, faithfully fulfil its obligations under the Geneva agreement, and shift from its position of confrontation to negotiation.

Secondly, the United States, as a party directly responsible for the Korean question, should fundamentally change its anachronistic policy towards Korea, and refrain from any acts of hindering the independent and peaceful reunification of the Korean nation.

No explanation is needed about the fact that the Korean question, namely, the question of Korea's reunification, is the outcome of the US occupation of south Korea and its colonial policy there. And the painful reality of Korea suffering the

tragedy of national division for over half a century originated precisely in the US dominationist policy towards Korea.

The United States has been keeping soldiers stationed in south Korea for over 60 years, using it as a lever for its political and military domination of south Korea. Meanwhile, it is attempting to undermine or disintegrate the north Korean system, through its cooperation with south Korea. For this reason, the United States is under an obligation to the Korean nation and the rest of the world, the times and history to work for the benefit of peace and reunification on the Korean peninsula. To fulfil its obligation, it should undertake two tasks.

The first one is to show a positive and conciliatory attitude to the issue of replacing the armistice arrangement with a peace mechanism in Korea.

North Korea demands that a peace agreement should be concluded between the United States and north Korea for the settlement of durable peace on the Korean peninsula. This demand is based on the irrefutable fact that the signatories to the Korean Armistice Agreement are the United States and north Korea, and that the military prerogative of south Korea is in the hands of the Pentagon.

The United States has set up in south Korea a military commission headed by the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the US and south Korean armed forces, and made the commander of the US-south Korean combined forces uphold the strategic policy of this commission, disclosing the fact that the so-called “joint exercise” of right to operational control is merely a “formal contract” and the transfer of the right to control the routine operations to south Korean military forces is nothing but an imaginary symbol. In fact, it is the United States that has the full command of the US-

south Korean combined forces, including the right to operational control. One needs to be reminded of the fact that the regulations on the formation of the US-south Korean combined forces Command include a provision whereby the commander of the US-south Korean combined forces, namely, the commander of the US forces in south Korea, is duty-bound to report and be obedient to only the Headquarters of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, and has no obligation to forward a report to the south Korean government.

This situation constitutes the ground on which north Korea shows its interest in the US-north Korea talks, rather than north-south dialogue, in the settlement of the issue of a peace arrangement in Korea.

North Korea's demand for a peace agreement with the United States is also cogent in that south Korea fought during the Korean war with its military command having been transferred to the "UN Forces," that the signatories to the Korean Armistice Agreement were north Korea, the United States as the representative of the "UN Forces," and China, with south Korea having been excluded, indicating that south Korea was not a legal belligerent, that the parties to be bound and governed by the conditions and terms of the armistice are the United States and north Korea, and that the US-south Korea alliance, which is an opponent of north Korea, is not a horizontal relationship such as can be found between the United States and Western Europe or Japan, but a "deformed relationship of alliance" in the form of subjugation of south Korea to the United States, which has full command of the US-south Korean combined forces. Consequently, the United States should discard its unscientific and unrealistic conception about dialogue between the north and south of Korea for peace

arrangement in Korea, and immediately agree to US-north Korea talks for a peace agreement.

The second task for the United States is to support Korea's plan for reunification through a form of federation.

In the light of its "engagement and enlargement strategy," the United States attempts to attain its strategic target: Achieving peaceful co-existence with north Korea, while patching up north-south relations into a union of states based on its theory of two states, on the one hand, and drawing north Korea into the sphere of its domination in Northeast Asia on the other.

In contrast to this, north Korea's strategic target is as follows: If peaceful co-existence prevails between north Korea and the United States through bilateral political consultations, the United States can make an "honourable," phased withdrawal of its troops from south Korea. Then Korea, as a neutral, unified federal state based on the theory of one state, could establish diplomatic relations with the United States.

North Korea and the United States are in a tug-of-war over their respective contrasting strategic targets.

Now that Kim Jong Il stated, "We are unwilling to consider the United States to be an arch-enemy. We want normalization of relations between the two countries," the United States should reverse its attempt to "divide and rule," and support the plan for reunification by federation. This plan is aimed at achieving reunification without encroaching upon the vested rights of the United States in south Korea in terms of resources, market and technology. Therefore, the United States would have no excuse for opposing it. The United States does not know about its opponent and itself. It should not reject Kim Jong Il's good faith but make a right option conducive to Korea's reunification.

2) Attitude towards Japan: It Should Redress Its Past and Abandon Its Hostile Policy towards North Korea

Japan, which is to Korea a “near yet faraway country,” committed heinous crimes against the Korean nation, the crimes of the Japanese imperialists which the Korean people will never forget. Their cruel colonial rule and plunder, national obliteration policy and inhuman atrocities in Korea, though each and every piece of evidence of them is not enumerated here, have been chiseled into the minds of the Korean nation, remaining for ever as the source of flare-up of national indignation against Japan among the Korean people.

Yet, “Japan, for its part, is very hostile to north Korea, showing contempt for the Korean nation.” (*General Kim Jong Il’s Strategy for Reunification*, Kim Myong Chol, a Korean military commentator in Japan)

The ruling circles of Japan harbour feelings of fear and hostility towards north Korea, while adopting a contemptuous attitude to south Korea. As far as the question of Korea’s reunification is concerned, it sees eye to eye with the United States, obstructing Korea’s reunification.

Kim Jong Il’s strategic objective with regard to Japan is to make it redress its past and seek co-existence and co-prosperity with Korea, both countries becoming close and friendly neighbours with a long tradition of historical and cultural relations.

He proposes three preconditions for the improvement of DPRK-Japan relations in a friendly way.

The first precondition is the issue of Japan sincerely reflecting on its past wrongdoings and compensating for them.

The Japanese imperialists committed heinous crimes against the Korean nation.

Given hereunder is a brief account of the criminal record of Japanese imperialism from the time of “Ulsa Five-Point Treaty” up to Korea’s liberation on August 15, 1945.

On November 17, 1905 (the year of Ulsa by the traditional calendar), Ito Hirobumi, the then President of the Privy Council, gave the final touches to the conclusion of the “Ulsa Five-Point Treaty,” a forged document which had not been through formal procedure on the side of Korea—it had not been approved and signed by the sovereign of Korea nor stamped with the Seal of State. This treaty was invalid in the light of international law. The core of this treaty was the deprivation of Korea’s right to diplomacy and establishment of a Japanese Residency-General. By invoking this treaty, Japan set up its Residency-General in Seoul and appointed Ito Hirobumi its first resident-general. This was the start of Korea’s colonization by Japanese imperialism.

On August 29, 1910, Japan arranged by coercion the conclusion of the “Korea-Japan Annexation Treaty,” by which it annexed Korea. It replaced the Residency-General with a Government-General, and took full control of executive, judicial and legislative powers and military command in Korea.

Then it set up a network of gendarmerie and police organs, staffed with over 22 000 military policemen and 200 000 assistant military policemen, in 16 214 places throughout Korea, and forced even primary schoolteachers to wear swords.

The Japanese occupation force in Korea was made up of two army divisions and two navy detachments. Guards were stationed in each county and at each strategic point, and gendarmes and policemen were vested with discretionary authority. In addition, 24 prisons were set up. The Korean

people were forced to become “Japanese subjects” and Korea’s time-honoured history and culture of 5 000 years were slighted. The Koreans were denied the right to speak Korean and use their Korean names. Approximately 16 million people, or 80 percent of the total population, were forced to change their names into the Japanese ones. Over 8.4 million people were conscripted into the army or drafted into forced labour. As many as 200 000 Korean women, unmarried, married or newly-married, were abducted to either Japan or Japan’s overseas bases to go through humiliating experiences as sex slaves.

The grain stolen by Japan from 1910 amounted to 39 million tons. The amount of gold Japan took out of Korea was more than 500 tons at least. Eighteen million tons of steel was stolen. Japan robbed Korea of 30 million cubic metres of timber, and took away 14 320 000 tons of fish from Korea.

Japan excavated almost all the old tombs in all parts of Korea in a bid to plunder Korea’s cultural properties.

With a view to destroying the national soul of Korea, the Japanese set up the headquarters of the Government-General in front of Kyongbok Palace in Seoul, and tampered with the Sokgulam Cave Temple, which had been preserved for 1 000 years, so that the cave was affected by damp. Originally, while building this temple, the people of the ancient kingdom of Silla had placed in the central hall a statue of the Buddha with its face to the east, with the intention of pacifying the Japanese by means of Buddha’s mercy.

The above-mentioned are only a small part of the offences committed by Japan against the Korean nation.

History can never be revised or scrapped. He who turns a blind eye to the past becomes blind to the present as well. One should bear in mind that lack of heart-felt repentance and atonement brings no relief. He who is oblivious to this historic

principle or negates it comes to forfeit his future.

It is known to everyone that Japan, while turning a blind eye to its crime-ridden past, has joined the international political bandwagon, with the rise of neo-nationalism backed by its enormous economic power. The attempt of the conservative circles of Japan to revise history textbooks with the aim of creating a new “great image of Japan” by distorting the heart-rending historical facts and persistently preaching the theory of Japan’s superiority vis-a-vis Korea, is arousing great apprehension in Asia and the rest of the world, developing into a diplomatic issue.

The textbook compiled by the “Society for Preparing a New History Textbook” and printed by the Fusosha Publishing House contains in its modern history section the following typical examples of distortion: threat from Korea; justification of Japan’s annexation of Korea; cover-up of the Kanghwa Island incident; and misleading account of the Kabo Peasant War. The textbook deletes the issue of sex slaves for the Japanese army. The part devoted to ancient and medieval history assumes that the “Mimana Miyake” theory is factual, and justifies its invasion of Korea in the year of Imjin (1592), while stressing the “superiority” of Japanese history through disparagement of Korean history.

“Threat from Korea” Theory:

The textbook calls the Korean peninsula a fist aimed at Japan. If the peninsula falls into the hands of a power hostile to Japan, it will serve as an ideal base for an attack against the latter. In this case, Japan, an archipelago with no rear area to rely on, will find it difficult to defend itself. In this sense, the theory of the “threat from Korea” was used to justify Japan’s occupation of Korea.

Coercive Annexation of Korea:

The textbook writes that “the Japanese government deemed the annexation of Korea necessary for the security of Japan and the protection of the interests of Manchuria. Great Britain, the United States and Russia made no objection to it,” in an attempt to cover up Japan’s aggressive act and coercive manner in the process of its annexation of Korea, and explains that the annexation was in conformity with international law.

The authors of the textbook also write that “Japan annexed Korea and ruled it as a colony because An Jung Gun assassinated Ito Hirobumi in Harbin, Manchuria,” covering up Japan’s actual plan for Korea’s annexation, by blaming the assassination for its annexation of Korea.

Omission of the Issue of the Sexual Enslavement of Korean Women for the Japanese Army:

The issue of the sexual enslavement of Korean women for the Japanese army, a crime symbolic of Japan’s cruelty, is deliberately omitted in the textbook. It runs counter to the contents of the recent international report to the UN Human Rights Commission and to the admission by the chief cabinet secretary of Japan in 1993 to the coercive character of sexual enslavement and the involvement of the Japanese military authorities in the process.

The textbook compiled by the “Society for Preparing a New History Textbook” and printed by Fusosha Publishing House, and the previously controversial books, like that edited by the National Assembly in Defence of Japan and *New Edition of Japanese History*, mirror the outlook of the ruling conservatives in Japan on history, revealing Japan’s intention to seek a revival

of militarism and a new “Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere” by combining the old outlook of the conservatives on history and the “new conservative” tendency of the younger generation. Motivated by this intention, the Japanese authorities are making reckless statements one after another, praising the postwar emperor system and military system, and justifying Korea’s invasion by the Japanese imperialists. Especially, the conservative politicians of Japan have been visiting the Yasukuni Shrine, blatantly revealing their historical viewpoint and mentality.

Ignoring the strong objections at home and abroad, Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi visited the Yasukuni Shrine on August 13, 2000, exposing himself to worldwide criticism. Also in total defiance of the criticism and furious protests at home and abroad, the conservative politicians of Japan visited the shrine on August 15—the day of Japan’s defeat. Their action is interpreted as a silent expression of their ideological and mental attitude, and political position that Japan’s invasion of Korea and colonial rule there, as well as the plundering of Asia are expressive of “patriotism” on the part of the Japanese and, therefore, can on no account be considered to be criminal acts. For this reason, the present Japanese authorities can hardly feel guilty about the previous crimes committed by the Japanese imperialists. When considered from another angle, it is also related to the political backwardness and immorality of Japan.

The Yasukuni Shrine commemorates the 2.5 million or so dead war criminals from the time of the Sino-Japanese War to the Second World War. It serves as a place for inspiring the Japanese with the militarist spirit.

The author of the book *General Kim Jong Il's Strategy for Reunification* analyses the reason why Japan refuses to repent of its sins as follows: Japan is unwilling to be ahead of the United States in action; Japan is contemptuous of Korea; Japan considers it unnecessary to be hasty in repenting of its past and normalizing diplomatic relations with north Korea; Japan is afraid that its sincere repentance would set a precedent, prompting other countries as well to call for compensation; Japan thinks that if it refuses to repent it will not be condemned by either the United States or European countries. Some points of this analysis may draw agreement from the readers, and some points need to be made clearer. As shown by the visit to Pyongyang by Shin Kanemaru, former Deputy Prime Minister of Japan, Japan is merely coordinating the progress of north Korea-Japan relations in keeping with the process of north Korea-US and north-south relations. And it would be right to estimate that Japan is contemptuous of south Korea, which is currying favour with Japan. But it is not contemptuous of north Korea with its strong sense of independence; rather, it fears north Korea.

The Japanese right-wing conservative politicians, now obsessed with ambition for neo-nationalism and revival of militarism, feel fear and hostility towards north Korea which is considered to have a formidable independent force, especially the military capability to destroy the Japanese archipelago at any time. Their fear and hostility are, in a sense, quite natural in view of their political and ideological standpoints. The Japanese authorities may find no urgency for apology and compensation to north Korea in the current situation, but the situation will certainly change, compelling them to reflect on their political viewpoint, and make due apology and compensation.

Up to now Japan has made “apologetic” statements through the mouths of either the emperor or prime ministers. By the words “sorry” or “regrettable” uttered individually about Japan’s invasion of Korea and the resultant colonial plunder there, Japan is avoiding an official apology. This behaviour is motivated by its attitude that the contemporary Japanese people have not brought misfortune and suffering upon the Korean nation, and that the younger generation has no obligation to take responsibility and apologize for the crimes committed by their forebears.

Historical debts are not written off, but remain as they are even though time has passed and the debtor has died. And a few words are not enough to compensate for the dead souls of millions of Korean people killed by the Japanese imperialists, the immeasurable loss of material property and the tragic hiatus in the time-honoured history of the Korean nation.

Historical debts are by no means written off of their own accord. Francois Mitterand, former French President, visited Switzerland in 1984, where he was called on by the representatives of a village. The representatives asked for payment of a debt which Napoleon Bonaparte had incurred from their community 200 years previously, to be exact 104 kettles taken from the villagers by Napoleon’s soldiers, payment for 2 037 pine trees, costing six francs each, salaries of villagers drafted into the army at three francs each per day, and payment for the use of mules, at a cost of six francs each per day. Mitterand paid the debt there and then, without a word of complaint. Payment of historical debts, large or small, should all be settled in this way.

The Japanese authorities should neither distort history nor evade their obligation to redress the past. They will have to

bear in mind that the one and only way for Japan to contribute to world peace and the development of human race as a dignified member of international community is to begin with proper redress for its past.

The second precondition for improvement of north Korea-Japan relations is for Japan to abandon its hostile policy towards north Korea.

A number of factors are acting on Japan's hostile policy towards north Korea: the political and ideological attitudes of the current Japanese authorities and systematic and ideological differences between north Korea and Japan; the US-Japan-south Korea tripartite military alliance and cooperation system in the fields of politics, the economy and the military; and the promotion of militarism among the Japanese people.

For ease of understanding, it is appropriate to make a brief analysis of the ideological and political attitudes of Japanese political circles.

Those who were responsible for Korea's colonization, and aggressive wars and massacres in Asia, and those who have been embellishing such acts, were and are anti-communists, whereas those who opposed or have been opposing them were and are communists, socialists, progressive elements and liberals.

The pedigree of those with ideological and political attitudes which spur them to refuse to redress the past while distorting history is stained with the murky blood of militarism and ultra-nationalism carried on through generations. In contrast, the people who are now opposed to the militarist and ultra-nationalist ideas and the policy of the current Japanese authorities are the heirs of people who were in the past opposed to the maltreatment, slaughter and war against the Koreans and other Asian peoples. Both the present and the older generations

in this category had and have a record of imprisonment or persecution by the extreme right-wing advocates of anti-communism, ultra-nationalism and the emperor system in Japan.

Then the anti-communists, rightists or ultra-rightists and emperor worshippers are, most certainly, pro-American, pro-south Korean elements and supporters of the process of Japan becoming a military power. The hostile policy pursued by the Japanese authorities towards north Korea is saturated with anti-communism and ultra-rightist conservatism, of which the moral values have been reversed.

Japan's hostile policy towards north Korea finds its expression also in its "threat from north Korea" theory. From the historical point of view, Japan has been more particular than the United States about suspicion of north Korea's nuclear development programme and its missile development, readily picking a quarrel with north Korea.

For instance, when north Korea launched its artificial satellite *Kwangmyongsong No. 1* in August 1998, Japan asserted that the satellite was a missile, making a reckless fuss about "threat from north Korea." The fuss was deliberately intended to create a false information and thus mislead public opinion, in order to achieve the ultimate aim of greatly stepping up its military policy.

But what was Japan's position when the former Soviet Union deployed 160 SS-20 missiles each with a one-megaton warhead with a range of 5 000 km in the vicinity of Lake Baikal?

Reports had been made of the deployment of these missiles, but Japan's mass media had not been as fussy as they were at the time of north Korea's launch of the *Kwangmyongsong No.1*.

Why, then, are the Japanese authorities still persistent in their claim about a “threat from north Korea”? It is because they are seeking a change in Japan’s military policy and intending to bring its necessity home to the Japanese people.

According to Japan’s Defence Agency, the present military policy of Japan is geared to setting up a complete political and military system whereby Japan should be enabled to use its armed forces overseas for “world security,” so that both the United States and Japan can jointly cope with world disputes, on the basis of “US-Japan Defence Cooperation Guidelines.” For this reason, Japan is in a fever about a “threat from north Korea,” as it was about international contribution during the Gulf War.

As explained above, Japan’s hostile policy towards north Korea is deep-seated against a background of dyed-in-the-wool conservatism. Now that the Cold-War era has given way to the 21st century, a so-called “era of reconciliation and cooperation,” Japan will have to abandon its hostile policy towards north Korea, a policy running counter to the times and history. If not, its future will be gloomy. Japan will gain nothing from this policy so it will have to adopt independent diplomacy and abandon its hostile policy towards north Korea for the sake of both its national development and the welfare of its people.

The third precondition for improvement of north Korea-Japan relations is for Japan to refrain from acts of instigating permanent division and hampering reunification on the Korean peninsula.

Japan is still obsessed with its colonialist attitude in its approach to the Korean peninsula. It is seeking its national interests in the division of Korea, and so it turns out to be an opposition factor vis-a-vis Korea’s reunification. Japan,

burning with an ambition to dominate Asia once again, an ambition expressed in its pursuit of neo-nationalism and a new “Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere,” is dead set against Korea’s reunification.

Coming into vogue in Japan now are neo-militarism and the idea of a new “Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere,” expressions of which were found in the “Asia Co-existence Festival” events held in praise of Japan’s previous aggressive wars, on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of Japan’s defeat. The proponents of neo-militarism and a new “Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere” are the main force working to keep Korea divided into north and south, and dominate them both, thus becoming the strongest force against Korea’s reunification. Among the 275 Diet members who opposed the “Resolution on Apology for War and Renunciation of War,” 207, or 70 percent, are members of the “South Korea-Japan Parliamentary Union,” the so-called pro-south Korean elements. This fact is very relevant to the prospects for Korea’s reunification. (*Plan for Mechanism of Unified Korea*, p. 38)

North Korea has historically considered instigation of Korea’s division and opposition to its reunification to be the “concentrated expression of a hostile policy” towards it. Hence, it opposes “cross-recognition” of both the north and the south of Korea.

As is well known, the theory of “cross-recognition”, which calls on Korea’s four neighbouring states to recognize both the north and the south of Korea crosswise almost simultaneously, was proposed for the purpose of perpetuating Korea’s division and hampering its reunification. The purpose of this theory faced a rebuff from north Korea. The possibility of establishment of diplomatic relations between north Korea and the United States and between north Korea and Japan, is

available only on the premise of refraining from attempts to oppose Korea's reunification and fix its division.

North Korea, proceeding from its perspective of the necessity for Korea's reunification, regards Japan's one-sided policy in favour of south Korea as an expression of its support for or instigation of "two Koreas" and as an expression of its hostile policy towards north Korea. Therefore, Japan must, above all else, rectify its colonialist, one-sided anti-reunification policy towards south Korea.

Some years ago, essays on the theme of Japan's attitude to Korea were published in Japan amidst great interest of Japanese scholars and economic experts. According to them, "Japan would direct five percent of its effort to help open north Korea and ten percent to help strengthen the position of south Korea, while seeking the reunion of both sides over a long period of time." These essays, though having a striking lacuna in their argument expressed in their inconsideration of the strong independent and national characteristics of north Korea's political attitude, are noteworthy in that they at least implied the orientation of Japan's policy towards Korea.

In other words, Japan does not want a radical change in Korea. Japan's strategy for Korea is neither an independent and peaceful reunification of Korea through national cooperation between the north and the south nor a sudden reunion by means of absorption; it is south Korea-led reunification. This means that Japan has not corrected its one-sided policy in favour of south Korea nor abandoned its hostile policy towards north Korea; it is only a cover-up of the nakedness of Japan's position. Japan's attitude, to all intents and purposes, is not to do anything conducive to Korea's reunification for improvement of relations between north Korea and Japan.

As examined above, the three preconditions set by Kim Jong Il

for improvement of north Korea-Japan relations, namely, Japan's redress of its past, renunciation of its hostile policy towards north Korea and equidistance diplomacy aimed at Korea's reunification, are fair, above-board and reasonable conditions and principles in terms of historical and realistic aspects.

Then can the Japanese authorities possibly accept these preconditions and act appropriately? Japan's current policy of shrinking from its responsibility to redress its past, showing hostility to north Korea and opposing Korea's reunification is deep-rooted in the current Japanese government's political attitude and anti-historical streak issuing from their political and ideological qualities. But this policy cannot but be changed in keeping with the trend of the times and history. Moreover, Japan will be compelled to re-examine and correct its policy, judging by the fact that the DPRK and its citizens that have become a powerful state and a great nation thanks to the wise leadership of Kim Jong Il, are no longer what they were in the past.

Both the United States and Japan are now standing at a crossroads—to comply with the demands of history, the times and mankind, or run counter to them only to become outcasts of history. They will have to make a correct decision on the basis of a correct judgment of the trend of the times. Kim Jong Il's attitude towards the nations concerned can serve as a compass for them to find a way out.

3. THEORY OF REUNIFICATION BY FEDERATION

Kim Jong Il is considered to be the same as President Kim Il Sung, the fact of which means he has inherited and personified President Kim Il Sung's idea, theory and leadership qualities.

From this perspective, Kim Jong Il's theory of reunification by federation can be understood as the inheritance and development of President Kim Il Sung's idea and theory of reunification by federation. Hence, a study of the theoretical analysis of the "Koryo Federation" out of Kim Jong Il's theory of reunification by federation and of interpretation of the "federation-commonwealth system" is essential for a comprehensive understanding of Kim Jong Il's theory of national reunification as a whole. Now that the "federation-commonwealth system," which encompasses the reunification-orientated aspects of north Korea's low-level federation and ROK President Kim Dae Jung's "commonwealth system" has been specified in the June 15 North-South Joint Declaration as an important agreement, the "federation-commonwealth system" needs to be studied in a fresh light as Kim Jong Il's reunification plan conforming to the present reality. Proceeding from this point of view, I would like to present my study of the main direction, frame and methodology for the formation of a "federation-commonwealth system."

1) General Understanding of Federation

The state, according to the structural form of power governing a territory and its inhabitants, is largely categorized into two forms: a unitary state and a federal state. A unitary state implies unitary character of power, while a federal state implies plural character of power.

Plural character of power is inherent in a system of government where more than two independent states sharing common interests and national sentiments unite to form a central power structure for a lasting common objective. In this sense, a federal government is called a composite state.

A federal state is a form of state adopted by multiracial entities

with diverse racial composition and complicated racial problems. About 20 countries known as federal states are characterised by racial complication: Switzerland, Canada, and the former Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia are or were composed of more than one race each; Myanmar and Cameroon are made up of dozens of races or tribes, while India and the former Soviet Union is and was each composed of some 200 racial groups or tribes, big and small. Such complication of racial composition entails diversity in language, customs and cultural traditions, rendering the formation of a unitary state impossible.

The form of federation is categorized into federal state and commonwealth, which are different from one another. From the point of view of international laws, a federal state is a single power entity, while in a commonwealth the member states are all regarded as respective entities with full rights to state power. In this sense, a federal state is the substantial power entity in the light of international laws.

The essential difference between a federal state and a commonwealth is that the federal government in the federal system has direct authority over not only its member states but their citizens as well. As far as the basic structure of a federal state is concerned, it is common that authority over internal affairs is distributed among the federal authorities and the member states as stipulated in the constitution, while authority over external affairs is vested in the federal state. Consequently, the authority of a federal state is shared between the federal authority and its member states.

A federal state exercises its legislative, judicial and administrative power within its jurisdiction, while the member states have their own legislative, administrative and judicial authorities. Yet, it is only the federal government that is empowered to formulate and implement foreign policy, engage

in war and enter into international treaties in the political, economic and military areas.

Let me introduce hereunder a synopsis of the characteristics of a federal state and a commonwealth.

First, the characteristics of a federal state:

Written Constitution

The Constitution of a federal state is generally written, and, at the same time, rigid.

Bicameral Legislature

Generally speaking, a federal state has a bicameral legislature consisting of a lower house composed of representatives of the entire population, and an upper house consisting of representatives of regional governments.

Division of Power

A federal state takes the form of centralism, with the authority over diplomacy and national defence concentrated in the central government. Regional governments are allowed to have authority over their internal affairs or administration within their jurisdiction, and thus do not become parties to international law.

A federal state has the duty to maintain “neutrality” and “equality” among its various regional governments, while ensuring regional autonomy. The regional autonomy of a federal state is different from the regional autonomy in a unitary state aimed at checking concentration of power and ensuring democracy. Likewise, the regional governments of a federal state are not regional autonomous establishments.

Supreme Federal Court

A federal state has a supreme federal court with the mission of interpreting the constitution. The decision of this court on the interpretation and application of the constitution is binding on regional governments and their legislatures.

Unitary State

A special characteristic of a federal state is the fact that it is a union of more than one state or state-like organization, while at the same time being a unitary state in itself.

A federal state is characteristically different from any “international league” of a number of sovereign states, such as the United Nations, in that it is in possession as a state of inviolability and sovereignty.

Next, the characteristics of a commonwealth vis-a-vis the above-mentioned characteristics of a federal state;

Constitution

The constitutional structure of a commonwealth is commonly divided between the central and local governments (represented respectively in the upper house and lower house), which have their own constitutions.

Federal Assembly

Local governments send their representatives to the central government to agree on the formation of a federal assembly, which, however, has no legislative or financial authority. The decision of the federal assembly is not legally binding on local governments.

Supreme Federal Court

Usually, a commonwealth does not have such an organizational structure as a supreme court.

Union of States

A union of states is not a unitary state in that the sovereignty of its member states is recognized in international law. The essential concept of the theory of a “union of states” is, to all intents and purposes, confined to the theory of a “commonwealth.”

In view of the above-mentioned definitions, what type of federation should a reunified state of Korea seek? This is a question to which the Korean nation will have to find an answer, as it has to achieve national reunification by combining the two different systems in the north and the south.

2) Theory of Reunification by the “Koryo Federation” Formula

It is a stark reality that two different ideas and systems govern the north and south of Korea respectively. Given this situation, reunification under a single system is unrealistic, for this would only aggravate division and antagonism, rather than achieve reunification, leading to a national catastrophe.

In view of the burning desire of the Korean nation and the stark reality in both the north and the south, the best way for reunification is to establish a unified state through a federation based on one nation and one state, two systems and two governments, the Koryo Federation (plan for the establishment of the Democratic Federal Republic of Koryo) proposed by President Kim Il Sung and now being pursued by General Kim Jong Il.

Essential Nature of the Federation of Koryo

The plan for the Federation of Koryo holds that Korea should be reunified by founding a federal republic through the establishment of a unified national government on the condition that the north and the south recognize and tolerate each other’s ideas and social systems, a government in which the two sides are represented on an equal footing and under

which they exercise regional autonomy with equal right and duties.

A more concrete analysis of this plan leads to the conclusion that its essential content is characterized by the establishment of a unified national government on the basis of both the north and the south recognizing and tolerating each other's ideas and social systems, a government in which both sides are represented on an equal footing.

It proceeds from the premise that the north and the south can certainly set up a unified state if they maintain the principle of placing the fundamental interests and demands of the nation above all else, and subordinating everything to them, though the ideas and social systems of the two sides are fundamentally different from one another.

The unified national government proposed by the plan for the Federation of Koryo means that a unified government should be established by the homogenous Korean nation, including all the Korean people in the north, the south and abroad, a government to be set up on the principle of the national ideals.

The opponents of this plan insist that the different ideas and social systems in the north and the south would render the establishment of a federal system impossible.

As far as the management structure of a federal state is concerned, the federal states in the world, capitalist or socialist, are all multi-national states with no exception, made up of regional governments or member states with the nation as the unit. Had these countries been homogenous nations, other than multi-national states, they would not have chosen a federal system necessarily. The conditions of the state management system and for the composition of multi-national states would make the co-existence of two different systems within the

federation impossible, because where political systems are different from one nation to another within a federal state, a federal system would become impossible to set up due to the aggravating antagonism between the member nations.

A federation of Korea, however, would be different from those of multi-national states in that it would be the reunion or reunification of the homogenous nation that has been divided temporarily due to foreign forces. In a word, a federation of Korea is necessary because of its north and south having become “heterogeneous” due to the division, and is possible because of the homogeneity of the Korean people both in the north and in the south.

If the political systems in the north and the south were one and the same in quality, there would be no problem of the homogenous Korean nation achieving reunification right now, rather than seeking federation. Therefore, the plan for the Federation of Koryo is quite realistic.

Meanwhile, the plan for the Federation of Koryo points out the principle of equal footing of both the north and the south in their representation in the unified national government. It means that the unified government would be composed of the same number of representatives of each side on an equal footing.

If any one of the two sides to form the federal government is in an unequal position in the composition of the unified government, the side at a disadvantage and with its interests encroached upon will be unwilling to agree to federation. Even if the federation is formed in spite of all this, the system certainly would not become solid nor satisfy the interests and demands of the entire nation in a fair way.

With regard to this matter, south Korea has advocated “proportional representation” as the most fair and democratic

principle in all of its reunification plans; in this context, it has dug its heels in, insisting that reunification be achieved through a general election throughout Korea on the principle of proportional representation. This assertion seems plausible on the surface, but it conceals the true intention of south Korea, whose population is two times greater than that of north Korea, to take the dominant position in the federation. Such an attitude would prevent the north and the south from achieving peaceful reunification by federation. Hence, the plan for the Federation of Koryo that proposes equal representation of both the north and the south in the unified national government is a fairer reunification programme.

Further, the plan for the Federation of Koryo presents as one of the essential aspects of the federal state the regional autonomy of both the north and the south with equal rights and duties under the unified national government. I think this aspect refers to the legal status of both sides that would make up Democratic Federal Republic of Koryo.

A correct definition of the legal status of the regional governments as the legal basis of the federal state is, in general, the key to success in the formation of the federation.

The Democratic Federal Republic of Koryo will be a special federal state to be made up of two autonomous regions in the north and the south, respectively, which have nothing in common with structural units of the state like regional governments of federal states in general with certain authority to exercise. The two regions would exercise autonomy under the supervision of the federal government, with equal rights and duties. Regional autonomy here means a system whereby the regional governments of both sides, under the guidance of unified national government of the unified state and with equal rights and duties, conduct independent activities respectively to

the extent of meeting the fundamental interests and demands of the entire nation.

In this sense, regional autonomy under the Federation of Koryo would be different in character from that of any other type of federation such as a multi-national federation.

In short, regional autonomy of multi-national federation is what is exercised by a nation or a region under the common socio-political system of the given federal state, while regional autonomy under the Federation of Koryo would be in force within the same nation under two different social systems. In other words, the former ensures the independent character of the region or nation concerned to the extent of realizing common socio-political interests of the whole federation, while the latter ensures the independent identity of different systems to the extent of realizing the national unity and coordinated development of the national community.

This would be the legal basis on which Korea's federal state is to be established for national reunification in the true sense. If Korea's federation takes on the form of a union or a federation of different states, for example, a commonwealth, it would leave the room for actual recognition of the two regional areas of the north and the south as respective states, leading to justification of "two Koreas" in the long run.

Power Structure (Political Structure) of the Federation of Koryo

Scientific definition of the power structure in state building is, in general, a key to establishing a federation and correctly defining its functions. Moreover, it is all the more important, given the fact that establishing a unified country of "one nation

and one state with two systems and two governments” is an event unprecedented in world history.

As far as the power structure, a matter of key importance in the formation of a federal system, is concerned, the Federation of Koryo would be composed of a rational power structure in consonance with the specific conditions and the purpose of formation of a federal state in Korea.

A supreme national federal assembly would be set up, which, as the supreme representative organ of the entire Korean nation, would function as the unified government of the Democratic Federal Republic of Koryo.

The supreme national federal assembly would be formed with an equal number of representatives from the north and the south, and an appropriate number of representatives of overseas Korean nationals. It would also form a federal standing committee.

Unlike the structure of an ordinary federal state, which usually has a bicameral government system consisting of national representatives and representatives of regional governments, the Federation of Koryo would have a unicameral system composed of representatives of the regional governments in the north and the south and representatives of political parties and overseas Koreans. This unicameral system is considered to be the best option in consideration of the characteristics of the type of federation and the purpose of its formation in Korea. Unlike federal states hitherto formed, the federation in Korea would take the form of one nation, one state and two regional governments, without any need for an upper house consisting of national representatives. In other words, the Federation of Koryo would not need a bicameral system because the unicameral system representing the general will of the entire nation by

allowing representation of the authorities and political parties in the north and the south and the overseas Koreans, would be sufficient for it to function as intended by the objective of its formation.

The plan for the Federation of Koryo also clarifies the issue of the presidency of the supreme national federal assembly as the unified government of the federal state and the chairmanship of the federal standing committee.

As the federal state is to be formed on the condition that both the north and the south tolerate each other's ideas and systems, setting a correct principle for selecting the head of the unified government is an important issue bearing upon the fate of the federal state itself. If this principle is in favour of one side and unfair to the other it will cause deviations in the establishment and operation of the unified government, making the federal state, in the final analysis, unable to maintain its unique character, and the existence of the federation itself unstable.

In this context, the principle of selecting the president of the supreme national federal assembly, the unified government of the federal state, and the chairman of the federal standing committee should conform to the constitutional features of the federal state that is to be established under the situation of the north and the south being different from each other in ideas and systems. The plan for the Federation of Koryo offers the most correct solution to this problem. It sets the principle of selecting the co-presidents of the supreme national federal assembly and the co-chairmen of the federal standing committee respectively from both the north and the south, making it a rule for them to perform their duties by rotation during their set terms of office.

Functions of the Unified Federal State of Koryo

The state is considered, in general, to be the entity performing political, economic and social welfare functions, through which the actual rule of a modern state is exercised.

To explain these functions of the state area by area, political function is, in a narrow sense, the inherent function of the state covering administration, legislation, judicature, diplomacy and national security, of which diplomacy and national defence are the focus of discussion as far as the functions of a federal state is concerned.

Economic function has been given high prominence since the emergence of modern state. The struggle of the masses of the people to throw off the yoke of feudalism gave rise to the formation of modern state. Along with the development of capitalism the importance of the economic function of the state grew in tandem with its political function. Meanwhile, in a socialist state the state function as the organizer of economic affairs is considered one of the major functions of the state in carrying out the socialist revolution and construction.

As concerns the state function related to social welfare in the capitalist system, the state power came to be closely intertwined with capital and the exploitation of the workers and other working masses was stepped up, with the result that the labour movement gained in strength. Given this situation, the capitalist state as a combination of power and capital, advanced a welfare policy as a sop to the discontent and struggle of the working class and other masses. Now this concept of social welfare has paved the way for the definition of another function of the state—social welfare function.

Hence, politics, the economy and social welfare constitute

the key functions of a modern state, which a unified federal state in Korea will have to perform. Yet, this unified federal state in Korea will face a challenge in its performance of the state functions. At the initial stage of federation the regional governments in the north and the south are expected to rule their respective regions, while the federal government should perform its function in such an indirect way as addressing the problems of the respective regional governments in the political, economic, social and cultural areas and promoting the coordinated development of the nation as a whole, rather than directly performing the political, economic and social welfare functions devolving on a modern state. Herein lies the unique feature of this federal state in terms of its state functions. In other words, for its peculiar nature different from that of other federal states, the coordinating function of the unified federal state of Koryo at its early stage will be of paramount importance. Nothing is more important for this type of federal state which is based on two different ideologies and systems, than to properly coordinate the relations between the two regional governments and promote the common interest of the nation on the basis of the common denominator—one nation—transcending the differences between the two systems and ideologies.

Promotion of the common interests of the nation transcending the differences between the two social systems is precisely the basic function of the unified federal state.

Then, what would be the specific function to be performed by this unified federal state vis-a-vis the regional governments of the federal state?

Firstly, the unified government of the federal state would guide the activities of the regional governments in the north and the south, coordinate the relations of both parties and

control the overall affairs of the federal state.

One of the important functions of the unified government would be to discuss and decide political, national defence and foreign affairs, and other matters of common concern related to the interests of the country and the nation as a whole, fairly and in accordance with the Korean people's desire for national unity, cooperation and reunification.

The unified government, above all else, would discuss and decide all matters of common concern related to the interests of the country and the nation as a whole. In other words, its main function would be the discussion and decision of matters concerned with realizing national sovereignty and unity, and coordinated development, rather than dealing with matters related to the interests of either of the two regions.

The fundamental principle to be maintained by the unified government in this regard is to strictly abide by fairness in discussing and deciding the issues within its jurisdiction. Fairness means formulating the policies of the unified government and implementing them in conformity with the demands and desire of the entire people in the interests of the nation as a whole, and refraining from taking sides.

Such a function of the unified government is a correct reflection of the character and compositional features of the unified government under federal system.

To sum up, the unified government of the federal state would be a unified national government embracing the whole territory and entire nation of Korea, and entrusted with the mission to cater to the fundamental interests and demand of the nation. It would also be a government established on the condition that the north and the south recognize and tolerate each other's ideas and social systems, a government in which the two sides are represented on an equal footing. Hence, the

unified government would be duty-bound to discuss and decide the matters related to the interests of the country and the nation as a whole, and deal with them in a fair way so that the unity and cohesion of the entire nation is strengthened.

Another important function of the unified government of the federal state would be to facilitate the coordinated development of the country and the nation, and step up unity and cooperation between the north and the south in all spheres.

For the unified government to facilitate the coordinated development of the country and the nation means strengthening ties between the north and the south in all spheres of politics, the economy, culture, the military and diplomacy, and adjusting and developing them rationally in a unified manner to meet the requirements for the realization of national sovereignty.

Realizing unity and cooperation between the north and the south in all spheres means that the two regional governments would dispel mutual distrust and put an end to conflict and antagonism while working towards cooperation and unity for coordinated development and prosperity of the nation as a whole in all areas of social life.

Another function of the unified government of the federal state is to respect the different social systems, administrative bodies and political parties and organizations, and the opinions of people of all walks of life, and to bar one party from forcing its will upon another. This is important, because poor performance of this function might lead to the destruction of the federation itself, and so this function is the principle to be adhered to by the unified government in its overall policy implementation.

Secondly, the Koryo federal system sets a rational definition of the functions of regional governments forming the federation.

The regional governments under the Koryo federal system should, according to the terms of reference, pursue independent policies on the one hand and work towards coordinated development of the nation as a whole on the other.

One of the key functions of the regional governments will be formulation and implementation of independent policies under the guidance of the federal government and within the scope of meeting the fundamental interests and requirement of the nation as a whole.

The terms of reference for the functions of the two regional governments in the north and the south specify the basic principle ruling the formulation and implementation of their independent policies. The two regional governments would formulate and implement independent policies as required by their respective systems and ideologies. Unlike sovereign states, however, they would be restricted from pursuing any policy that would satisfy only their respective interests and requirements in all spheres. They would be required to function only under the guidance of the unified government of the federal state and refrain from pursuing any policy detrimental to the fundamental interests and demand of the nation as a whole. This is the rule of action for the regional governments to observe in the formulation and implementation of their policies.

Another function characteristic of the regional governments would be for them to strive to bridge the gap between the two sides and achieve the coordinated development of the whole nation. Apart from this function, it would be impossible to ensure success in dealing with the matters of realizing the independence of the whole nation and achieving sound development and prosperity for the entire country and nation. Therefore, this would constitute an important function essential

to both the unified government and regional governments of the federal state.

The Basic Policy of the Unified State under the Koryo Federal System

As specified above, the basic functions of the unified state under the federal system would require a policy for independence, peace and great national unity throughout the course of development of the unified state until it is complete. This policy orientation, as far as I understand it, would be based on the ideas and principles of the July 4 Joint Statement, and its specific contents would be set out in the 10-point policy of the Koryo Federation.

First, the unified state would have to pursue an independent policy.

What makes up the concept of sovereign power would be external inviolability and independence, national autonomy and supremacy of national authority. Where its external inviolability is violated and its sovereignty is not recognized, the country in question is, naturally, not a sovereign state. And, needless to say, in the case of the country being unable to formulate and implement its own independent policy due to its regard for the reaction of other countries, the state cannot be regarded as a genuinely independent, sovereign state in spite of the fact that it has its own name and government. A unified state should naturally maintain its independent policy and implement it. It should not become either a satellite or protectorate of any neighbouring state; it should be a truly independent and sovereign state immune to influence from foreign forces.

The independence of a state in international relations is

manifested chiefly in its policies of non-alignment and neutrality.

Non-alignment and neutrality are vital to a unified state under a federal system, as they are reflections of aspirations issuing from the characteristic nature of the state structure. A federal structure is a combination of its component units, a combination of the two systems, in the north and the south of Korea, respectively, which is possible only when the balance between the two is maintained. By balance, I mean when the two different systems are treated on an equal footing without prejudice against either of them. If a unified state under a federal system is in favour of one side or the other, it is hard to define the federation as having combined the two systems in an equal and rational way. In Germany, for example, reunification of east and west created a relationship between the centre and the periphery, failing to meet the national expectations of reunification.

A federal state uniting the north and the south of Korea into one requires a minimum precondition—that the mutual relationship between the component parts of the federation should not be one of domination and subordination by one over the other. If the north-south relationship within the framework of a federation were to be one between centre and periphery it would mean the tragedy of reducing the north-south relationship to an internal conflict within the nation. This is the corollary of structural and functional characteristics of unified state under a federal system.

Given the reality of Korea, reunification via a federal system would lead inevitably to neutrality in international relations. Moreover, neutrality renders reunification via a federal system more secure and constitutes a solid basis for a unified federal state.

Then, what would be the concrete content of non-alignment and neutrality policy, the core of independent line of unified state under federal system?

Above all else, an independent attitude should be maintained in the field of politics. This means opposing all forms of foreign interference and dependence on foreign forces, exercising complete sovereignty in internal and external activities, and settling all questions arising in state politics independently in keeping with the common interests of the nation. Guided by an independent attitude, the unified state should be a fully independent and sovereign one and a non-aligned nation which is not a satellite of any other nation and does not depend on any foreign forces. At the same time, it should adhere to the line of independence in its external relations and resort to equidistance diplomacy by developing friendly relations with all nations on the principles of independence, non-interference in internal affairs, equality, mutual benefit and peaceful co-existence.

Next, the principle of independence, the line of self-reliant defence should be adhered to in the field of military affairs.

An independent line of non-alignment and neutrality is impossible apart from independence in military affairs. Military dependence on foreign countries is as good as unilaterally renouncing one's own independence and running counter to the line of non-alignment and neutrality. A unified Korean state should hold fast to the line of independence in military affairs, while maintaining the principle of non-alignment, the principle of refraining from joining any bilateral or multilateral military alliance or bloc.

The independent line of non-alignment and neutrality can hardly be maintained unless the internal driving force of the nation is in full gear.

By internal driving force, I mean the political, military and economic force. The reality of international politics in which political intervention and interference, economic subjugation and armed aggression are the result of frequent attempts made by the powerful nations against small countries which are in pursuit of non-alignment and neutrality, shows that it is impossible to maintain independence marked by non-alignment and neutrality without an internal driving force.

While fostering strong political power by promoting national unity and solid economic might through construction of a self-sustaining national economy, the unified state should build self-reliant military capabilities to actively deal with possible foreign intervention.

Second, the unified state would have to effect democracy in the pursuance of its policies.

By democracy, I mean the policy of guaranteeing and defending the freedoms and rights of the entire people in the north and the south in all areas of social life. More concretely, the unified state should guarantee freedom to form political parties and social organizations and their freedom of action, religious belief, speech, the press, assembly and demonstration, and guarantee the rights of the people in the north and the south to travel freely across the country and to conduct political, economic and cultural activities freely in any area. Democracy should not be biased against either of the two sides. The unified state should refrain from taking sides and pursue a fair policy guaranteeing the interests of the systems, political parties, classes and strata in the north and the south. Proceeding from the principle of great national unity, the unified government should not question the past records of any of the organizations or individuals in the north and the south that work for the development of the unified state, but should join hands with

them, and should not allow any form of political reprisal or persecution.

Third, the unified state should pursue a policy of restoring the links between the north and the south that have been severed.

Pursuit of this policy is the work of restoring the territory that has been bisected due to national division and also restoring the links between the people in the north and the south in terms of everyday life. The unified government should remove the demarcation line, restore the telecommunication and railway lines between the north and the south, and open shipping routes on the East and West seas and air routes between Seoul and Pyongyang, and between Mt. Paektu and Jeju Island. It should realize north-south exchanges in the spheres of the economy, culture and sports, and ensure the uniform progress of the country's science and technology, national culture and art, and national education.

Fourth, the unified state should make extensive arrangements for cooperation and collaboration between the north and the south for the building of an advanced country in which the two parts can achieve co-existence and co-prosperity as one nation. The damage suffered by the Korean nation which is one whole organism living on the same land, the damage caused due to the artificial division of the nation, is really immense beyond imagination. So far, the mental and material energy of the nation has been wasted unnecessarily, and the national potential, with which a prosperous country could have already been built, has been exploited inappropriately. Therefore, the unified state should set as an important policy the effecting of economic cooperation and exchanges between the north and the south, and ensure the independent development of the national economy. Meanwhile,

it should promote cooperation between the north and the south in the sphere of culture and academic studies, such as north-south joint research into the national language and history.

Fifth, the unified state should pursue a peace policy.

The peace policy of the unified state should be closely related to its policy of independence; the former must be formulated and implemented in relation to the latter. The peace policy would be drawn up and pursued in two aspects—internal and external.

Internally, the unified state should ensure national reconciliation and a peaceful life. It would be an extremely pressing task for this state, which would have become reunified after scores of years of national division that caused national antagonism and tension, to make a clean sweep of the after-effects of national division and bring lasting peace to its citizens.

Above all, the unified state should strive to remove the roots of mistrust and misunderstanding between the north and the south, and at the same time make strenuous efforts to create an atmosphere of national reconciliation. This is, in the sense of the political concept of the new state, a process of bringing settled peace.

Next, the unified state should find a peaceful settlement in the military aspect. Peaceful steps such as both the north and the south making a commitment to mutual non-aggression and reducing armaments are a precondition for national reunification. However, many issues with regard to permanent peace would still remain unresolved in the military aspect even after peaceful reunification. The federal system would have to amalgamate the armies of the north and the south, an issue essential to national reconciliation and peaceful existence. As a follow-up, abolishing the Military Demarcation Line between

the north and the south, dismantling military installations in its vicinity, dissolving militia organizations, slashing military budgets, turning defence industries into peaceful civilian industries, and other peace-making measures should be implemented as the policy of the unified government of the federal state.

It would be important for the unified government to consistently pursue in its external relations a peace-loving policy, some aspects of which are pointed out hereunder:

Above all else, the unified Korea should not become a threat to its neighbouring countries or the rest of the world.

And it should, in the field of international affairs, refrain from involvement or cooperation in, or support for any acts of aggression.

And it should ban the presence of foreign troops and foreign military bases from its territory and adhere to a non-nuclear status—prohibiting the production or introduction of nuclear weapons, and refusing the cover of any nuclear umbrella.

Next, in the international arena, it should oppose “power policy” or “balance of power” policy based on the former, and strive to establish friendly relations with all countries.

The theory of a unified state under a federal system faithfully reflects the above-mentioned peace-loving policies in its major policy indicators—removal of military confrontation between the north and the south, reduction of the military strength of the two sides to a total of 100 000-150 000, removal of the Military Demarcation Line and military installations in its vicinity, founding of a single combined national army and adherence to the policy of non-alignment and neutrality.

The basic policy of a unified state under the Koryo federal system would accurately reflect the common aspirations,

demands and interests of the Korean nation in accordance with the character and mission of a federal state. It is a most patriotic, independent and peace-loving policy illuminating the road ahead for a unified Korea.

Name of the Unified State under the Koryo Federal System

The Federation of Koryo has made a rational choice for naming the unified state.

It is common, in general, that a racial or geographical symbol, and a state system or mode of alliance are reflected in naming a country. In the light of this practice, a brief analysis of the name “Democratic Federal Republic of Koryo,” chosen to indicate the unified state of Korea under a federal system seems to be significant.

In the case of forming a unified state by uniting more than one regional government or individual state, it is common practice to adopt a regional name of a particular area, or a particular name to name the state concerned. For instance, the United States of America was so named from the geographical name of America, while the Swiss Confederation was named by choosing the name of the first canton, Schwyz, that initiated confederation.

Unlike the common practice, the name proposed for the Koryo federation originates in the name of the kingdom of Koryo, the first unified state on the Korean peninsula.

The proposal for naming the federal state the Democratic Federal Republic of Koryo is appropriate in that it is based on a scientific analysis of Koryo’s historic profile and international identification.

Koryo was Korea’s first unified state, and this name

became widely known throughout the world as meaning the Korean nation.

The historic profile of Koryo is highlighted in the history of the Korean nation above all else by the fact that it was the first unified Korean state which put an end to the state of division of the homogeneous Korean nation with the same bloodline and language, and achieved national and state unification. In addition, its international prestige was very high.

The international prestige of Koryo during its existence was clearly demonstrated in its wars against foreign aggressors. Koryo's victory in these wars brought its name to worldwide attention. Especially, the high standards of its economic and cultural development enabled Koryo to conduct brisk trade and cultural exchanges with China's Song and Jin dynasties. Merchants from Japan and even from as far away as the Middle East came to Koryo to trade. It was from this period that the name Koryo was used worldwide to indicate Korea.

The proposal for designating the federal state the Democratic Federal Republic of Koryo is also appropriate because it is supported by a scientific analysis of the common political ideals of both the north and the south aspiring after democracy.

Democracy is a common political ideal acceptable to both the capitalist south and the socialist north, nationalists and socialists. And it is an inviolable right to be enjoyed by the broad sections of the people as the masters of the state and society.

Meanwhile, the name Democratic Federal Republic of Koryo reflects the mode of state union, i.e., a federation on the one hand, and the political system, i.e., a republic, on the other.

The Proposed Federation of Koryo Is the Best Way to Korea's Reunification

There seems to be no plan for Korea's reunification that is applicable to Korea's specific situation other than a federation.

The federation formula, which embodies the principle of one side not conquering the other, is a very feasible option. The differences between the north and the south in ideology and system cannot be an insurmountable barrier to reunification, since the entire nation regards reunification as its supreme task.

A federation in the form of one nation, one state, two systems and two governments is a unique, unprecedented way towards reunification.

The proposed Federation of Koryo is a rational, fair and realistic way to national reunification.

It is, above all, the shortest and surest way, which suits the actual situation in Korea.

The reason is that such a federation would be the full embodiment of the three principles of independence, peaceful reunification and great national unity, which serve as the common programme for national reunification accepted by the entire Korean nation.

The proposed Federation of Koryo envisages the establishment of a unified state independently by the efforts of the Korean nation itself. Therefore, if this formula is chosen, no foreign force would have any reason to interfere with Korea's reunification, clearing the way for a solution to the independent reunification of Korea. And since the establishment of a unified state by way of a federation also presupposes toleration and recognition of the different ideas and systems existing in the north and the south, peaceful reunification would be possible free from bloodshed or

conflicts. The formula would also make it possible to bring about reunification on the principle of great national unity because the federation itself would be formed on the basis of removing distrust and misunderstanding between the north and the south.

The second reason is that the Federation of Koryo would make it possible to transcend the differences between the north and the south in ideology and system from the broad perspective. Given the actual situation of both sides, the establishment of a unified state based on a single system is an unrealistic option. Only a new plan for reunification designed to tolerate the differences between the north and the south in ideology and system can prevent the permanent division of the Korean nation, make a fresh development of the movement for reunification and bring about reunification in the shortest time possible. This new plan is precisely the Federation of Koryo formula, which presents a blueprint for Korea's reunification, attaching importance to the historic community of the homogeneous Korean nation and taking it as a basic factor for bringing together the different ideologies and systems of the north and the south.

This federation is also a reasonable and fair way to reunification acceptable to all classes, strata and political parties in the north and the south.

If a plan for reunification is to be a fair, reasonable and realistic one, it should be so designed as to be acceptable to all classes and strata, political parties and groups in the north and the south, whose class interests conflict with one another. The Federation of Koryo gives fair and due consideration to the interests of the authorities, different sections, political parties and groups on both sides so that none of them would feel that its interests could be encroached upon. This is illustrated by the main contents of the formula for the federation.

The Federation of Koryo defines the formation of the federal state and its power structure, distribution of authority and duties, character, functions, basic policy and the name of the unified country in a fair and unbiased way in accordance with the common desires and demands of both sides. It is, therefore, a most realistic and rational programme for reunification, which can be supported and accepted by all Koreans who love their nation and aspire after reunification, irrespective of their ideological inclination, political viewpoint, religion or place of residence.

Refutation of Criticism of the Federation of Koryo Formula

The Federation of Koryo formula is a fair and reasonable plan for Korea's reunification, which embodies the three principles of national reunification pointed out in the July 4 Joint Statement, and its applicability has been proved in the process of the development of the reunification movement. From the first day of its publication, however, it has drawn criticism from the successive ruling authorities of south Korea and some right-wing conservative intellectuals there.

I would like to refute some points of this criticism, in order to help the readers to have a better understanding of the rationality, applicability and fairness of the federation formula.

The bottom line of the criticism is that the formula is impossible to be materialized because there is no precedent for it; it goes against conventional types of state formation.

The argument is, in short, that all states, including federal ones, which have ever existed are based on a single social system; hence, there can never be a state with two different systems. They say, "The federation proposed by the north is

itself unrealizable as it conceives impossibility from the starting point.” This is not criticism of some of the content of the proposal but overall opposition to it in principle.

Needless to say, the above-mentioned unified state through the Federation of Koryo formula is a unique, unprecedented form of state in the sense that it would be a state formed with two different systems in the north and the south. However, if it is considered unrealizable just for the reason that there is no precedent for it, I would like to ask:

What exactly is history and what exactly is creation?

History is neither the simple passage of time nor the accumulation of past events. It is precisely the course of creative efforts of humankind aspiring after an independent life to conquer nature, and transform and develop society for the future. Human society would stagnate like standing water if human beings were too content with their past experience and knowledge to accumulate new experience and create fresh knowledge.

In view of the supreme national task of the Korean people to put an end to national division and achieve reunification, the Federation of Koryo formula is intended to bring about an unprecedented form of state. Herein lies the originality of the Federation of Koryo formula. Therefore, it should be an object of admiration and support rather than an object of criticism.

As regards this problem, some detractors comment: “The north insists that a unified government should be established on the condition that the north and the south recognize and tolerate each other’s ideas and systems, a government where the two sides are represented on an equal footing. But how can the two different sides of the north and the south be united under one constitution? An agreement between states with different ideas and systems is possible, but a union between different systems

under one constitution is impossible. Nothing like such a federal state can be found in history.”

Such criticism only bespeaks their misunderstanding of the question of national reunification and ignorance of the proposal. The question of Korea’s reunification, as mentioned on several occasions, is not a question of the union of two different states, but a question of the reunion of two regions of the same nation and state, a question of special form originating in the artificial division of the country. Accordingly, it necessitates an independent stand of solving the problem from a new viewpoint and with a new theory, apart from conventional theory and experience.

In spite of this, the critics regard the south and the north as two separate entities, applying the established theory on a federal state at random. In general, the basis for the formation of a federal state is a constitution, and the basis for the union of states is a treaty. With regard to the question of Korea’s reunification, i.e., the question of forming a unified federal state, a unitary constitution suited to a federal system may serve as the legal basis for the formation of a federal state, or if such a constitution is considered unnecessary, national agreements, namely, a joint declaration like the July 15 Joint Declaration and the accompanying agreements could lead to a unified state based on the Federation of Koryo formula. The point at issue is that the north and the south should be faithful to the principle of establishing a unified government in which both are represented on an equal footing, on the condition that each side recognizes and tolerates the different idea and system of the other. Mentioned so far is the first wrong point of the advocacy of “starting point of impossibility for the Federation of Koryo formula.”

Another wrong point of the advocacy in terms of viewpoint

and understanding is manifested in their dogmatic understanding of what a constitution is. Undoubtedly, a constitution is the legal basis and the basic law of a state. The structure and form of a constitution, however, are not immutable. In fact, south Korea's constitution is quite different from that of the north in terms of the framework, and theoretical and legal structure and contents. The British and US constitutions have nothing in common with the German Constitution, and the constitution of a socialist state is different from that of a capitalist state. So it is logical that the constitution of the unified federal state should be formulated creatively in conformity with the reality of the Korean peninsula and the purpose of the establishment of a unified state. In other words, codifying the fundamental conditions and principles for the establishment of a unified state and its structure, its political machinery and policy orientation, as well as its name, proceeding from the original meaning of a constitution being the basic law of a state, would immediately produce the constitution of the unified state. Therefore, talking about the "impossibility" of the Federation of Koryo formula, judging the question of Korea's reunification by European and American theories of the constitution is none other than a proof of their dogmatic mistake.

The next criticism is that of the "impossibility" of the Federation of Koryo formula in the present circumstances of the Korean nation.

According to the criticism, heterogeneity has to be removed before anything else for the reunion of the two heterogeneous societies with different ideals and systems into a nation-state. The critics insist that, therefore, the foremost task is to remove the heterogeneity between the south and the north aspect by aspect.

The wrong point of this criticism is too obvious to everyone to deserve any further refutation. Yet, I would like to put a question to them: If they consider the reunification of Korea by the federation formula based on two different systems to be impossible, given the situation of the Korean nation, then, isn't it more preposterous for them to think of reunification based on a single system?

Some of the critics persist that there should be a focus for the formation of a state, and it is not clear, as far as the Federation of Koryo formula is concerned, what would be the focus for the formation of the federal state; therefore, the "absurdity" of the proposal for a Federation of Koryo formula is evident.

In other words, the focus for the formation of a state is found in a unified social system, and no such focus would be available by mixing different systems.

Then, what is the focus for uniting the people to form a state? If the state is understood as consisting of territory, citizens and the "ruling government," the government is set up with the mission of representing and realizing permanently the common interests of the people living within the bounds of its territory. The common rights and interests of the people are the focus for forming a state. In the case of Korea, a homogeneous nation, the people and the nation comprising the state are not different from one another. The common interests of the people constitute precisely the common interests of the nation. The proposal for reunification by the Federation of Koryo formula aims at forming a single state for the common interests of the nation on the basis of the concept of the community of one and the same nation, though the systems in the north and the south are different. This would be the same situation as that of people with different ideas and religious beliefs living in the same

state. Therefore, the assertion that there cannot be a focus for the formation of a unified state in the case of the existing two different systems is nothing other than giving precedence to the system over the nation and refusing national reunification.

Sweeping over some quarters of south Korean society recently is an unrealistic argument about the policy of non-alignment and neutrality to be pursued by the Federation of Koryo—the transplanting into south Korea of an argument in Europe over the re-examination of the concept of neutrality in the present international politics in the post-Cold War era. It was reported a long time ago that, affected by the trend of the times following the end of the Cold War, the Swiss tradition of keeping neutrality has begun to crack, and Switzerland is re-examining its profile. This position of the European country is positive to some extent; yet, in the case of Korea, it needs to be considered carefully in many respects.

First, from the point of view of international law, the concept of neutrality is what was conceived before the development of antagonism between capitalism and socialism. With the appearance of modern nation-states and the international political arena where the states confronted each other, there arose the need for a political issue of neutrality. The permanent neutrality Switzerland could secure at the time of its independence in 1815 was made possible by the international agreement achieved following its experience of the Napoleonic Wars. There is no reason to assert that no more confrontation between blocs will ever occur again in international politics just because the confrontation between the East and the West is now over.

Second, the course of formation of the European Union (EU) indicates that the main purpose of European integration is for Western Europe to promote its common economic interests

and improve its political image vis-a-vis the United States and Japan. And the EU's economic foundations are, to all intents and purposes, the multi-nationals. As long as there remains monopoly capital, the essential end of which is to seek more profits, there can be no internationalism in the true sense of the word.

Judging from these two aspects, it is a short-sighted viewpoint to consider the concept of neutrality as being meaningless in present-day international politics. It is only when global independence, guaranteeing the absolute independence of all nations, is secured that the state of confrontation, domination and subjugation among nations can be removed from the world. Then, neutralism and non-alignment will not be needed, either. As long as there exists imperialism seeking hegemony and domination of the world, neutralism is still desirable and the non-aligned movement needs more input.

In the case of such a special region as the Korean peninsula, neutrality is certainly not insignificant. Ideological confrontation between the big countries in the vicinity of the Korean peninsula is not as sharp as before. But in spite of this, their attitude to the question of Korea's reunification is delicate and their interests in the matter are still entangled. Given this situation, taking tactful advantage of the political dynamics of relations among the nearby countries in a positive manner would pave the way to Korea's reunification. What is important here is, needless to say, a declaration by Korea's federal state of neutrality after reunification. The policy of non-alignment and neutrality of a federal state, propounded by the proposal for the Federation of Koryo formula can serve even now as an important basis for removing the political and military domination and interference of the United States in south Korea, the main

obstacle to Korea's reunification. Judging by this logic and considering that neutrality is an important policy to be pursued by a federal state in the exercise of its independent politics, rejection of the idea of the neutrality of the Federation of Koryo formula as an "outdated idea" is as good as opposition to the proposal for the federation itself.

Another reason for the south's opposition to the proposal for the Federation of Koryo formula is that the formula was initiated by the north. Their assertion is that the north's proposal is a dangerous tactic, the undercurrent of which is "reunification through communization." But waiting for reunification of the country under one system is like waiting for pigs to fly. For this reason, the north proposes reunification under the two co-existing systems. So what makes the south consider the proposal to be a tactic for "reunifying the country through communization"?

It is not the north alone that has proposed the federation formula. A considerable number of people in the south and overseas Koreans give full support to the proposal for a federation. Refusing the Federation of Koryo formula just because it is an initiative taken by the north is a symptom of a malignant "anti-communism" allergy. Such unreasonable and ill-considered opposition and criticism betray an inappropriate attitude to the reunification question, which is crucial to the destiny of the Korean nation.

In conclusion, criticizing the federation proposal is as good as renouncing reunification and calling for permanent division of the country. The formula is a plan for Korea's reunification, a proposal that has emerged from the highest sense of conscience of the Korean nation living for scores of years in a divided land.

3) Plan for Reunification by the “Federation-Commonwealth” Formula

I would like to comment in advance: After the publication of the June 15 North-South Joint Declaration in 2000, overseas Koreans termed the second item simply as a “Federation-Commonwealth” formula, an item of agreement that both the north and the south, recognizing that the low-level federation proposed by the north and the commonwealth system proposed by the south (President Kim Dae Jung’s proposal for a “Commonwealth of the Republics”) for the reunification of the country have some similarity, agreed to work together for reunification in this direction. They are extending active support and welcome to this agreement.

Reunification of Korea by a federation formula based on one nation, one state, two systems and two governments—this is the key principle running through Kim Jong Il’s outlook on reunification.

General Kim Jong Il recognizes the plan for the establishment of a unified state by a Federation of Koryo formula as a fair and reasonable option acceptable to both sides as the basis of a national agreement. Furthermore, in order to achieve a national agreement on the Federation of Koryo formula smoothly he seems to be entertaining an idea of investing the regional governments of the federal state with more authority temporarily, and then gradually enhancing the function of the central government, thus achieving reunification by federation in due course.

This viewpoint of his was highlighted by the historic June 15 North-South Joint Declaration, and confirmed during the summit talks in June 2000.

The dramatic meeting in Pyongyang between Chairman Kim Jong Il of the DPRK National Defence Commission and President Kim Dae Jung of south Korea and the ensuing publication of the historic June 15 North-South Joint Declaration threw the entire Korean nation into a state of great delight and shook the whole world. The June 15 North-South Joint Declaration signified the greatest success in the struggle of the Korean nation for national reunification for over half a century and was a milestone marking the imminence of reunification.

Hereunder are the items of agreement included in the historic joint declaration:

1. The north and the south agreed to solve the question of the country's reunification independently by the concerted efforts of the Korean nation responsible for it.

2. The north and the south, recognizing that the low-level federation proposed by the north and the commonwealth system proposed by the south for the reunification of the country have similarity, agreed to work together for reunification in this direction in the future.

3. The north and the south agreed to settle humanitarian issues as early as possible, including the exchange of visiting groups of separated families and relatives and the issue of unconverted long-term prisoners, to mark August 15 this year.

4. The north and the south agreed to promote the balanced development of the national economy through economic cooperation and build mutual confidence by activating cooperation and exchanges in all fields—social, cultural, sports, public health, environmental, and so on.

5. The north and the south agreed to hold authority-to-authority negotiations as soon as possible to put the above-mentioned agreed points into speedy operation.

How is it possible to combine the north's proposal for a low-level federation and the south's suggestion of a commonwealth system, as stipulated in the joint declaration? An in-depth study of several aspects would be needed for a correct answer to this question.

Prerequisite for Understanding the “Federation-Commonwealth” Formula

I would like to begin with the study of the form of federation the unified state of Korea should take in future in the light of the mode of union of states through the federation formula.

There may be two options in this regard. One is a formula similar to that of a commonwealth of states, whereby the north and the south would be equally authorized to deal with their respective diplomatic, defence and internal affairs, and the central government would implement what has been agreed upon by the regional governments through consultation. This would be a formula whereby the north and the south would make up a single unified state. The other would be a formula similar to that of a federal state, whereby the federal government would exercise authority over national defence and diplomatic affairs, and the two regional governments would retain for themselves only control over their local affairs under the guidance of the federal government.

These two options have similarity in the broad sense that both of them lead to national reunification through a federation formula. Yet, they are considerably different from one another in terms of the character of the federation and the procedure for its formation. Which of the two should be adopted, i.e., the

mode of a federal state or that of a commonwealth of states, would be decided by a pan-national agreement, specifically a mutual agreement between the north and the south. Be that as it may, it would be essential to closely study which of the two accords with the desire of the Korean nation for reunification and furthermore suits the specific conditions of both sides.

General Kim Jong Il considers it necessary, as far as reunification through a federation formula is concerned, to take account of the essential characteristics of national reunion and its premise.

First, what is the meaning of the establishment of a unified state for the Korean nation? It does not mean a process of uniting the two states on the basis of the fact that two sovereign states already exist on the Korean peninsula, but a process of reuniting the same nation on the ground that the original single state has been divided temporarily. A federation formula for the prevention of permanent division of the nation and reunification of the country on the premise that two sovereign states exist on the Korean peninsula is logically contradictory. The assertion should proceed from the premise that the existing two halves of the same nation should be reunited.

Proceeding from such a conception and premise, Kim Jong Il maintains that a bilateral agreement signed on an equal footing by the north and the south should be the basis for establishing a unified state in the form of a federation, and it must be a national political agreement geared to achieving national unity and reunification, far from taking on a form of international agreement between two sovereign states. This conception and viewpoint were confirmed in the north-south joint declaration.

Second, a unified state to be established in Korea would be different from all conventional federal states in terms of its component parts. As mentioned above, the conventional federal

states are characterized by the union or integration of two or more states with a unitary social system on the basis of the consideration of special aspects of regional interests and racial or religious differences. However, the unified state to be set up in Korea will be characterized by a union of the two different systems of the north and the south that have been established for more than half a century, though the nation itself is homogeneous.

True, from the perspective of Korea's federation formula of uniting the two sides while leaving their different social systems intact, the difference in social systems has so far rendered approaches and reconciliation between the north and the south difficult, posing a barrier to the reunion of the two sides. This is a reason why the south side has been reluctant to promptly accept the proposal for creating a centralized federal state from the outset.

With a deep understanding of these facts and premise, General Kim Jong Il analyses that the conditions for founding a completely centralized federal state right from the start remain immature. His conclusion is that, in spite of this, a commonwealth of states, a mere symbolic form of a "federation system," is not desirable, either. Accordingly, he regards it as an effective way of resolving the two above-mentioned questions to start with the federation formula within the framework of a unified state by empowering the regional governments of the north and the south to exercise great authority at the initial stage and then form a complete, centralized federal state by gradually transferring authority to the federal government as conditions mature.

The main concern of such a unified, federal state would be allocation of power at its initial stage, i.e., how should power be divided for the two parties—the federal government

composed of representatives of the north and the south and overseas Koreans, and the regional governments of the north and the south. As for state power, there would be no problem if the regional governments exercised power at the initial stage and shifted it to the federal government on a gradual basis, converting their armies into a national combined army. Problematic would be, however, the matter of representation of the state in foreign relations. If the regional governments still exercised their respective diplomatic rights and the federal government could not represent the unified state externally even after the proclamation of national reunification by a federation formula, the concept of “two Koreas” might persist in the international arena. This is supposedly the reason why General Kim Jong Il maintains that the federal state, with the declaration of reunification, should occupy a single seat in the UN as one member state. In actual fact, this is not an unresolvable problem, provided that both the north and the south were fully committed to national reunification and the founding of a unified state. The regional governments could appoint a joint representative to take one seat in the UN, or, if necessary, the federal government could delegate its representative, along with the representatives of the regional governments. The precedent of the former Soviet Union and its union republics, Ukraine and Belarus, having been UN member states separately can be referred to in this regard.

There is one point we must make clear with regard to General Kim Jong Il’s “Federation-Commonwealth” formula; neither the assertion that the “Federation-Commonwealth” formula means renunciation of the north’s proposal for a Federation of Koryo system and acceptance of the south’s proposal for a commonwealth system, nor the argument that it is a compromise between the two proposals in terms of the

functional aspect, is right. For the low-level federation proposed by the north from the late 1980s through the early 1990s is a part of the plan for reunification through the high-level Federation of Koryo formula.

The Main Content of the “Federation-Commonwealth” Formula and the Orientation for Its Application

The second item of the June 15 North-South Joint Declaration concerns the plan for reunification, an item which we may consider to be Kim Jong Il’s idea. According to this item, the north and the south, recognizing that the “low-level federation” proposed by the north and the “commonwealth system” proposed by the south have similarity, agreed to work together for reunification in this direction.

For a correct understanding of Kim Jong Il’s idea of a “Federation-Commonwealth” formula, it will be necessary, first of all, to make a close study of the stage-by-stage processes of its conception.

a. Stage-by-Stage Conception of “Federation-Commonwealth” Formula

Many people are of the opinion that Korea’s reunification would be possible if the incumbent authorities of the north and the south reach an agreement on the establishment of a mutually acceptable unified government through negotiations. For the translation into reality of these expectations of the nation, a solution needs to be found to the problem of how the background of a “mutually acceptable unified government” should be designed. Currently the two sides of Korea are putting forward two contradictory political ideals—the south

keeping a “liberal democratic system” and the north maintaining a socialist political system based on the Juche idea. There is no room for these two systems to compromise.

Given this situation, either the north or the south would have to make a fundamental change in its existing system for the establishment of a unified state through a mutual agreement between the two governments. But the incumbent regime of the south and its upper class with its vested interests consider their “liberal democratic system” to be more valuable than reunification, and so they would on no account abandon the former just for the latter. Similarly, it is out of the question for the north to change its ideological system of Juche-orientated socialism. Then, is the reunification of Korea through mutual agreement next to impossible for the present? The answer is no. What has broken this seeming deadlock is precisely the Federation of Koryo formula designed to reunify the country on the principle of great national unity, transcending differences in ideologies, ideals and systems.

At present, most states with a federal system are said to have inherited traditions of power distribution and a high sense of tolerance and compromise towards various values and regional features. The Federation of Koryo formula proposed by the north is reasonable and feasible in that it is designed to reunify the homogeneous Korean nation as a single country with a long history of tolerance and unity and using one language, from the viewpoint of the national mindset, instead of from a class point of view. By contrast, the commonwealth system itself, proposed by the south, would not lead to the formation of a unified state. Even if the commonwealth system is envisaged to be developed into a federal state, it would be undesirable because it would be constantly accompanied by rivalry or re-division. And historical experience shows that

transition from a commonwealth system to a federation has always been accomplished by means of war.

The United States declared independence in 1776 after the American War of Independence against Britain, and established a confederation comprising 13 states in 1781, in accordance with the Articles of Confederation. Afterwards, two contradictory opinions arose: one asserting preservation of authority for each state and the other in favour of confederalism and presupposing the expansion of the powers of confederal government. This contradiction came to an end after the Civil War in 1861-1865 ended in victory for confederalism, and the transition from a commonwealth system to a confederation was made.

The Swiss Confederation, too, was created in 1848 only through the civil war of 1847-1848, although an alliance between cantons formed in the course of independence movements had been developed into a Confederation along with the independence of the country in 1815.

Now it is evident that the reunification of Korea cannot be achieved through a commonwealth formula. For an easy and quick arrival at a national agreement on the Federation of Koryo formula, however, the north side proposes a low-level federation, which was broached in the meeting of President Kim Il Sung and Rev. Mun Ik Hwan on the latter's visit to Pyongyang in March 1989. The proposal was officially made public in the Rev. Mun Ik Hwan-Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of the Fatherland (CPRF) joint declaration, and reiterated in the 1991 New Year Address of President Kim Il Sung.

After his meeting with President Kim Il Sung, Rev. Mun Ik Hwan called a press conference with journalists at home and abroad at

the People's Palace of Culture on April 2, nine days after his arrival in Pyongyang, and published a statement of agreement on "Nine Items of Principle for Independent and Peaceful Reunification."

Items No. 4 and No. 6 are as follows:

4. The two sides reached a unanimity of views that it is inevitable and reasonable for our nation to choose to achieve reunification by means of a federation on the principle of co-existence, whereby neither shall conquer the other or be conquered by the other, and neither shall overpower the other or be overpowered by the other, and as a concrete way of its realization it may be materialized at one time or step by step.

6. Rev. Mun Ik Hwan confirmed the negative attitude of the north towards "cross recognition" and "cross contacts," and its determination to achieve reunification. The CPRF side affirmed that north-south exchanges and the proposal to achieve reunification through a federation on a phased basis asserted by Rev. Mun Ik Hwan are not for "two Koreas," and estimated them positively.

Since then, the concept of a "low-level federation" came to be included in the proposal of the DPRK for national reunification, and its similarity to the south's proposal for commonwealth system was confirmed by General Kim Jong Il through the June 15 joint declaration. As a result, the realistic idea of a "Federation-Commonwealth" formula has come into being for the Korean nation.

b. Theoretical Framework of the Low-Level Federation and Approach to It

North Korea gave an official account of the low-level federation idea on October 6, 2000, at a meeting of Pyongyang citizens in celebration of the 20th anniversary of the

presentation of the plan for founding the Democratic Federal Republic of Koryo. The report to the meeting pointed out that the key point of the low-level federation is to “develop north-south relations in a coordinated way by establishing a unified national institution under which the two regional governments in the north and the south would be allowed to continue functioning and exercising control over their respective political, military and diplomatic affairs, on the principle of one nation, one state, two systems and two governments.” On October 9 the same year, *Rodong Sinmun*, the organ of the Workers’ Party of Korea, carried an article which commented that “the proposal for a low-level federation is a temporary step towards a federal system.”

As mentioned above, the general theory of federation can be classified into two categories: federal state and union of states. Judging by the framework of this classification, the Koryo federal system proposed by the north would fall into the category of federal state, and the south’s proposal for a commonwealth system would belong to the category of union of states.

Obviously, the proposal for a Koryo federal system with its theoretical framework based on one nation, one state, two systems and two governments (regional autonomous governments) is considered unique and original, and accordingly the Koryo federal system itself is viewed as a perfect unified state.

The low-level federation is almost identical with the Koryo federal system, and, therefore, its essential concept, i.e., essential framework, can be correctly understood when considered with the logic of one nation, one state, two systems and two autonomous governments. This leads to a conclusion that realization of the low-level federation means initial achievement of Korea’s reunification.

However, the low-level federation, when viewed in the light of its form, looks identical to the proposal for a “Commonwealth of Republics,” or at least a north-south union based on one nation, two states, two systems and two separate governments, because it is designed to invest the governments of both sides with their current powers and functions.

As far as this point is concerned, critics may regard the proposal for a low-level federation as contradictory; however, the proposal is realistic, and convincing, applicable and also original as a temporary step for reunification.

To simplify the core of the idea of the formation of a unified state or a national community—these two concepts are different in the strict sense, but may be regarded as similar in general—and the approach to its process, north Korea is taking a federalist approach that political settlement of key problems should be made by attaching importance to a package deal in the political and military sectors, so that easier settlement is made possible in other areas.

South Korea, for its part, does not absolutely rule out a federalist approach, but basically adheres to a functionalist approach, from the logic that “reciprocal trade and information exchanges will develop functional inter-dependence between the two sides, leading to either partial integration or formation of the community, and integration in one sector expanding to other sectors, producing diffuse effects and so bringing about overall integration or the formation of the community.” (*The Idea of a Unified State on the Korean Peninsula, The Nation and Reunification*, Kang Jong Gu) This approach has several limitations: excessive emphasis on functions at the expense of the legislative, institutional and political systems and underestimation of political issues; no solution to the question of how economic and social inter-dependence and combination

between the two sides as a result of this approach can lead to political integration; and ignorance of the stark reality of political integration being achieved more easily by political will and action than by functional integration and cooperation and exchanges in the technological and economic sectors not leading to political integration of their own accord. Considered from the viewpoint of mode of approach, the south's plans for reunification, because of the limitations issuing from functionalist approach, take on a divisionist character, producing an adverse effect upon the cause of national reunification.

Needless to say, my explanation, which has applied the theory of reasoning and concept to the issue of Korea's reunification, is not enough to completely bring to light the north's theory on reunification. Nevertheless, my brief account of the issue can explain, at least, the limitations of the south's theory of reunification because it is defined and evolved by applying the theory of reasoning and concept. Anyhow, according to the comments of south Korean scholars, the low-level federation idea would win wide-ranging support and bring about national agreement rather easily, for it takes the federalist approach as its main direction, while regarding the functionalist approach as supplementary to the former. In other words, the low-level federation is a formula for settling urgent issues arising in the endeavour for reunification, and an undertaking of national significance, for instance, political reconciliation and unity between the north and the south and disarmament, matters of paramount importance, before resolving other issues, big and small, at the same time.

c. Similarity and Difference between Low-level Federation and the "Commonwealth of Republics"

The south's proposal for a commonwealth system mentioned in the June 15 joint declaration is, in essence, the "Commonwealth of Republics of the North and the South" based on President Kim Dae Jung's theory of three-stage reunification. Now that the contents of the low-level federation have already been studied above, it would be appropriate to identify the similarities and differences between the low-level federation and the commonwealth system in the context of a review of the "Commonwealth of Republics."

President Kim Dae Jung's plan for reunification incorporated in the "Commonwealth of Republics" is composed of three stages—south-north commonwealth, federation, and complete reunification—with its focus on the first stage, which is, in short, expressed as an idea of the first-phase commonwealth based on one nation, two states, two systems and two separate independent governments.

As far as I am concerned, there should be a close examination by way of comparison of the low-level federation and (Kim Dae Jung's) south-north commonwealth system. It is not because of the need for comparison between the low-level federation and the one-nation-two-states-two-systems-two-independent-governments framework—both of which leaving the existing systems in the north and the south intact; it is because of the need to compare the low-level federation and the first-phase commonwealth, incorporated in the "Commonwealth of Republics," the core of which is the composition of "the structure of the first-phase commonwealth."

The south-north commonwealth is envisaged as being composed of a south-north summit meeting as a supreme decision-making body, a south-north joint assembly as a

parliamentary organization, and a secretariat of the south-north joint assembly with its executive bodies such as south-north joint Cabinet and sectoral committees, so as to control the status of division in a peaceful way and promote effective development towards the second stage of reunification, i.e., a federation. Meanwhile, the south-north summit meeting would draft a south-north joint constitution, a basic law governing mutual relations, for approval by the south-north joint assembly.

To perfect such a government mechanism is the key objective of the first stage, which is a south-north commonwealth.

Viewed in this light, the low-level federation and the commonwealth system have something in common basically in the principle of one state and two regional governments, but they are different from one another in the fact that the former has been conceived within the framework of the Federation of Koryo formula based on one state and two systems, while the latter is rooted in the concept of a federation based on one state and one system.

In 1987, Kim Dae Jung officially proposed a “Federation of Republics” similar to the British Commonwealth of Nations, only to lay himself open to severe criticism by the then south Korean government and its ruling party because of the word “federation.” He had to scrap the use of the word temporarily. In April 1991 he proposed a “Commonwealth of Republics,” adding that he had changed the word “federation” to “commonwealth” because “commonwealth” would explain the meaning of first-stage reunification more explicitly than the previous “Federation of Republics.”

He explained that the “Commonwealth of Republics” is aimed at creating one commonwealth, and intended to “avoid

the use of the title ‘Union of States’, as it might give the wrong impression that the south and the north, being one and the same nation to be reunified, are two separate independent states.” His remark implies a common denominator which would bring the proposal for a low-level federation and the proposal for a commonwealth system close to each other.

In addition, what the first-stage commonwealth of republics has in common with the low-level federation is that it requires a single entry of the country into the UN under a single nomenclature of the newly-formed commonwealth and allows the two regional governments to exercise full control over their respective diplomatic, military and internal affairs. In this case the unified state would supposedly function as a single sovereign state in real earnest. In short, the north gives a positive appraisal of the proposal for a “Commonwealth of Republics” in view of the common points between the low-level federation and the commonwealth over the principle of one nation, one state and two regional governments. Viewed from the perspective of difference, the establishment of the south-north commonwealth is classified into two stages—before and after the establishment of the commonwealth. At the pre-establishment stage two systems and two separate governments would exist, and at the post-establishment stage the framework of one system and two regional governments would come into being, going over to the stage of a federation.

The afore-said common points and differences between a low-level federation, otherwise called a loose federation, and a commonwealth may be summarized as follows.

Common points:

- Regional governments are invested with major authority;
- A joint national government mechanism is formed with an equal number of representatives from both sides;

- The joint national government mechanism performs the function of coordinating mutual relations between the north and the south;

- Both proposals are for a high-level federation.

Differences:

- A low-level federation advocates the institution of a consultative body, while a commonwealth system requires the formation of a state machinery;

- The former defines regional governments as regional autonomous governments, while the latter defines them as independent governments, sometimes recognizing them as different states;

- The former regards its formation itself as the achievement of reunification in the early stage, whereas the latter considers the formation of the former as the transitional stage of reunification.

In conclusion, General Kim Jong Il's idea with regard to the formation of the "Federation-Commonwealth" is to organize a unified national mechanism with an equal number of representatives from both sides, whereby a federal state would be established, a state where two regional governments co-exist with equal powers over their respective defence, internal affairs and diplomacy. He regards it as Korea's reunification in its early stage.

The historic June 15 North-South Joint Declaration, published as an outcome of Kim Jong Il's strong resolution and foresight, turned the overwhelming trend of the situation on the Korean peninsula towards reunification.

Now the entire Korean nation needs to grapple with the task of translating into reality the idea of a "Federation-Commonwealth" set forth in the joint declaration, making headway for the reunification of the country. The future does not come of its own accord; it has to be created.

EDITOR'S POSTSCRIPT

As time flies like an arrow, as many as seven years have passed since Mr. Jang Sok, a Korean-American, published his work *Study of General Kim Jong Il's Theory on Korea's Reunification*, bearing witness to a tremendous change in the political situation on the Korean peninsula.

Amidst the atmosphere of reconciliation and cooperation growing warmer in the inter-Korean relations, Kim Jong Il's unshakable reunification-orientated viewpoint and attitude brought about the second inter-Korean summit meeting and talks from October 2 to 4, 2007. The summit meeting and talks reaffirmed the spirit of June 15 joint declaration and adopted the Declaration for Development of North-South Relations and Peace and Prosperity.

As a result, the Korean nation has made a great stride towards the goal of national reunification.

And the relations between Korea and other countries concerned have made a rapid turnaround thanks to Korea's Songun politics.

On October 9, 2006, Korea found itself under necessity to undertake an underground nuclear test based on its own wisdom and technology in order to prevent the constant danger of war caused by the United States and protect its national sovereignty and right to existence.

Such a situational change should suffice to prove the scientific accuracy of Mr. Jang Sok's assertion.

Korea will certainly emerge as a great, prosperous and powerful reunified nation according to General Kim Jong Il's policy on Korea's reunification.